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THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATIONS AND 
DEMOCRACY 
 
Franklin A. Gevurtz* 
 
Forthcoming in the Northeastern University Law Review 
 
 These are perilous times for American democracy. Among the 
threats, many point to the power of corporations. This article 
examines that threat by considering a series of dualisms 
characterizing the relationship between corporations and 
democracy. 
 
 This begins with a look at the anti- as well as the pro-democratic 
impacts of the earliest corporations and the paradoxes with respect 
to democracy created during the evolution of corporate law. The 
article then looks at internal corporate governance (so-called 
“corporate” or “shareholder democracy”) to show how, on the one 
hand, it contains features addressing some of the greatest current 
threats to American democracy, while, on the other hand, it operates 
as a fundamentally undemocratic vote buying system. This dualism 
in internal corporate governance, in turn, reflects a clash in the 
purpose for corporate or shareholder democracy: Is the purpose 
economic efficiency, or is it democratic legitimacy for those 
controlling the often-vast power of the corporation? 
 
 Finally, this article addresses the dualism in the internal and 
external aspects of the relationship between corporations and 
democracy by situating the governance and impact of corporations 
within the broader democratic governance of society. Specifically, 
individuals in charge of corporations lack democratic consent and 
accountability for their decisions unless either internal corporate 
governance is consistent with democratic values; persons without 
voice through internal corporate governance can avoid the impact 
of such decisions by not dealing with the corporation; or 
democratically elected federal, state, and local governments can 
intervene when externalities and market failures render refusal to 
deal unrealistic. This, in turn, suggests the need to limit excessive 
political influence by those in charge of corporations or to reform 
the anti-democratic aspects of internal corporate governance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 I confess to being a fan of science fiction portraying dystopian 
futures. A common trope in such fiction has powerful corporations 
controlling or even constituting the government while shadowy 
schemers or rich elites control the corporations.1 As with all such 
fiction, this vision of the future reflects present fears. Numerous 
writings both in academic2 and mainstream3 publications address the 
perceived danger that powerful corporations pose to democracy.4 
 
 Unfortunately, these writings often remind one of the parable of 
the blind men describing an elephant in which each description, 
while accurate in its own way, misses the mark in picturing the beast 
as a whole. Similarly, writings about corporations and democracy 
tend to look at pieces of the topic but, in doing so, can miss the 
bigger picture. 
 
                                                 
 1 E.g., Incorporated (TV series), WIKIPEDIA available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incorporated_(TV_series) (“The series takes place in a dystopian 
Milwaukee in the year 2074, where many countries have gone bankrupt due to a number of crises 
and climate change. In the absence of effective government, powerful multinational corporations 
have become de facto governments, controlling areas called Green Zones.”); Continuum (TV series), 
WIKIPEDIA available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_(TV_series) (program begins “in 
2077-era Vancouver under the corporatocratic and oligarchic dystopia of the North American Union 
and its Corporate Congress”). 
 2 E.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak, CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2017); Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmueller, Taming the Corporate Leviathan: Codetermination 
and the Democratic State, working paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3680769 (March 
30, 2021); Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERS. 113 (2017); 
Leo E. Strine Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts' Role in Eroding We the People's Ability to 
Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423 (2016). 
 3 E.g., Sheldon Whitehouse & Melanie Wachtell Stinnett, CAPTURED: THE CORPORATE 
INFILTRATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2017); Timothy Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: 
ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018); Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered 
American Democracy THE ATLANTIC (April 20, 2015). 
 4 This fear goes back to the founding of the republic. E.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, 
Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 894-96 (2016) (quoting early American sources, including Thomas 
Jefferson, expressing concern regarding the “aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare 
already to challenge our government”).  
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 Some writers, particularly those reacting to the Citizens United 
decision,5 focus on the external to the corporation. They address 
corporate influence over democratically elected governments and 
the clash between government efforts to control corporations and the 
assertion by corporations of free speech rights normally associated 
with individuals.6 As far as the internal governance of the 
corporation, it may as well be a black box in which an artificial 
intelligence commands decisions designed to increase corporate 
profits at the public’s expense.7 
 
 Other writers focus on the internal governance of the corporation. 
Starting with the fact that the individuals legally in charge of 
corporations (the members of the board of directors) are normally 
elected in an ostensibly democratic process,8 these writers address 
to what extent such “corporate” or “shareholder democracy” is 
consistent with democratic norms, and, if not, what, if anything, 
should be done about it.9 Typically unaddressed is the impact of this 
issue on the broader question of whether corporations promote or 
threaten democratic governance of society more generally. 
 
 Some writers address facets of the interplay between the external 
impact of corporations on democracy and internal corporate 
governance.10 Yet, even these writers can miss the total picture. 
 
                                                 
 5 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 6 E.g., Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 2; Strine, supra note 2; Zingales, supra note 2; Daniel 
H. Greenwood, Person, State or Not: The Place of Business Corporations in Our Constitutional 
Order, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 351 (2016); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217 (2010); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign 
Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010). 
 7 A number of writers implicitly attempt to justify this approach by invoking the so-called 
“shareholder primacy” norm. The argument is that we can look past the actual wishes of the human 
beings making decisions for corporations because the law commands them to focus on profits for the 
shareholders and nothing else. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision 
Course: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015) (explaining the shareholder primacy norm and its impact on the use of 
corporate power after Citizens United). Except in the most extreme case, however, the law in 
practice does not constrain directors in their discretion to balance shareholder profits versus other 
impacts of corporate activities. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real about Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (2002). 
 8 E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW 181 (3rd ed. 2021).   
 9 E.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder 
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419 (2020); Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, De-
Democratization of Firms: A Case Study of Publicly-Listed Private Equity Firms 9 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 323 (2019); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 
(2007); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 (2006). 
 10 E.g., Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2 (advocating worker election of some corporate 
directors to limit through “checks and balances” the threat corporations pose to democracy); 
Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016) (discussing 
the challenges for internal corporate governance in deciding whether corporations should assert First 
Amendment rights); David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1197 (2011) (advocating stakeholder representation on corporate boards---albeit not 
necessarily elected by the stakeholders---in order to protect the interests of corporate stakeholders 
who governments fail to protect because of corporate lobbying).  
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 In fact, the interaction of the external and internal relationship 
between corporations and democracy is one of a series of dualisms 
in the degree to which the governance of corporations, as well as the 
impact of corporations on the governance of society, advance or 
threaten democratic values. Among the dualisms are pro- and anti-
democratic impacts of corporations, conflicts between utilitarian 
economic goals and pursuing democratic values, and the ever-
present prospect for unintended consequences.    
 
 These dualisms began with the earliest business corporations, 
which engaged in tyrannical governance on the Indian subcontinent 
on the one hand11 but planted the seeds for democratic government 
in the United States on the other.12 They extend through a 
paradoxical corporate law evolution in which efforts to democratize 
the use of corporations by making them easy to establish had the 
impact of turning corporations into the dominant and oft-feared form 
for conducting large businesses.13 At the same time, the fear of 
highly successful and hence powerful corporations has collided with 
the desire both for the economic growth such corporations bring, as 
well as to avoid the economic dislocations caused by failed 
corporations.14 
 
 Further dualism exists between pro- and anti-democratic aspects 
of corporate or shareholder democracy. On the pro side, the 
enforcement of corporate law by judges outside of the body politic 
of any individual corporation allows corporate law to contain rules 
that mitigate some of the greatest current threats to democratic 
elections generally.15 Yet, shareholder democracy operates under a 
fundamentally anti-democratic pay-to-play system.16 This, in turn, 
reflects a dualism as to the purpose for shareholder voting: Does it 
exist to establish democratic legitimacy for those controlling the 
often-vast wealth and power of the corporation or is it simply a tool 
to incentivize economically efficient business decisions even at the 
expense of democratic values?17 
 
 This leads to the overriding dualism created by the interactions 
between the internal and the external regarding the governance and 
impact of corporations. A corporation (or more precisely a business 
corporation) is one a number of types of institutions or associations 
that compose any society and impact the lives of individuals in the 
                                                 
 11 See text accompanying notes 28 through 31 infra. 
 12 See text accompanying notes 39 through 48 infra. 
 13 See text accompanying notes 52 through 64 infra. 
 14 See text accompanying notes 74 through 80 infra. 
 15 See text accompanying notes 85 through 116 infra. 
 16 See text accompanying notes 144 through 155 infra. 
 17 See text accompanying notes 156 through 190 infra. 
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society. If the essence of democracy is the consent of,18 or 
accountability to,19 the governed, one must ask what provides that 
consent or accountability for those in charge of corporations (or, 
indeed, those in charge of other institutions and associations). To 
seek an answer, one must look not just at the internal governance of 
corporations or at the external constraints placed upon corporations, 
but at the interactions between both. 
 
 Consent or accountability does not exist unless those impacted by 
the decisions of the individuals in charge of corporations either have 
a voice through participation in the democratic election of those in 
charge, can realistically refuse to associate with the corporation and 
its activities (thereby denying consent or enforcing accountability 
through exit20), or can count on the prospect for democratically 
elected governments intervening when market failure or 
externalities render non-association into an inadequate protection. 
This means that excessive political influence by those in charge of 
corporations---the broad policy issue overhanging Citizens United--
-can upset this balance for achieving democratic accountability. 
This, in turn, suggests that democratic values may call for limiting 
the political influence of those in charge of corporations or 
rethinking the basic structure of corporate governance. 
 
 The tour through the dualisms which leads to this conclusion will 
proceed as follows: Part II of this article looks at the historical 
dualisms in the relationship between corporations and democracy. 
Part III then focuses on the internal by examining the dualisms 
underlying so-called corporate or shareholder democracy. Part IV 
expands the discussion to explore the interactions between the 
internal governance of the corporation and the impact of 
corporations on the broader democratic governance of society and 
outlines the implications of this analysis. 
 
II. THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN 
HISTORY 
 
 From the beginning, the interactions between corporations and 
democratic governance exhibited the dualisms underlying this topic. 
 
A. Territorial Governance by Early Corporations 
 
 While the science fiction visions of government by or under the 
control of powerful corporations, either in some far-off quadrant of 
                                                 
 18 E.g., The Declaration of Independence; Virginia Declaration of Rights. 
 19 E.g., Adam Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (2003). 
 20 See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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space or in a dystopian future Earth, might seem farfetched,21 it 
matches the early history of the corporation. This history captures 
both the prospect for corporations to serve as a source of despotic 
rule or as a source for instituting democratic government. The 
former involves the English East India Company, while the later 
involves the companies set up to establish colonies in what would 
become the United States.  
 
 1. The Anti-Democratic History of the East India Company 
 
 The East India Company received its charter from England’s first 
Queen Elizabeth at the start of the Seventeenth Century.22 This 
company (along with its Dutch competitor) played an important role 
in the development of what became known as a joint stock company-
--what we now call a business corporation in which numerous 
investors purchase transferable shares of ownership in a firm 
conducting a large-scale business (thereby becoming shareholders 
or stockholders).23 This model for conducting business has 
contributed considerably to economic growth.24 In terms of political 
history, however, the East India Company’s impact was far more 
negative. 
 
 From its outset, the East India Company reflected a hazy line 
between private enterprise and public function. While illustrative 
that the early corporate charters were granted in order to carry out 
some public function beyond simply profits for shareholders,25 the 
public function of the East India Company was not that noble. 
Among the powers listed in its charter was “to wage war” and the 
company’s trading fleet included warships.26 While the movies 
might suggest a focus on pirates, the wars initially waged were 
against traders from other European powers---who were using these 
ventures to engage in wars by proxy.27 
 
 In the Eighteenth Century, the East India Company raised an 
army and engaged in wars of conquest against the Mughal empire in 
                                                 
 21 But see Elon Musk on planning for Mars: ‘The city has to survive if the resupply ships stop 
coming from Earth’, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/09/spacex-plans-how-elon-musk-see-life-on-
mars.html (discussing Elon Musk’s proposal for a colony on Mars undertaken by his Space X 
corporation). 
 22 E.g., George Cawston & A.H. Keane, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 87 (1896). 
 23 E.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al, The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 193 (2017). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 
J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945) (early corporations were created to carry out some social function of the 
state).  
 26 E.g., William Dalrymple, The East India Company: The original corporate raiders, THE 
GUARDIAN (March 4, 2015). 
 27 E.g., East India Company, https://theodora.com/encyclopedia/e/east_india_company.html (last 
modified September 19, 2018). 
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India. Military success allowed the company to pillage the Bengal 
treasury---from whence the Hindustani term for pillage, “loot”, 
entered the English language. The company also forced an 
agreement on the local ruler for the company to supplant the Bengali 
government’s role in collecting taxes (which the company’s agents 
often accomplished through the use of torture).28 Heavy taxation and 
the company’s prohibition on local traders maintaining rice reserves 
to deal with crop failure combined with a drought a few years later 
to trigger a famine in which one out of three Bengalis (more than 10 
million people) died of starvation.29 Despite such costs on the local 
population, by early in the Nineteenth Century, the company 
controlled the Indian subcontinent with a private force twice the size 
of the British army.30 It would not be until the second half of the 
Nineteenth Century, after the company brutally put down a revolt 
by its own private army---hanging tens of thousands of suspected 
rebels in the process---that the English government decided it 
needed to get control of the situation and brought India within the 
British Empire.31 
 
 The company’s human rights violations were not limited to India. 
When China tried to prevent sales by the company of opium 
produced in Bengal, the result was the Opium Wars---China’s defeat 
in which prevented China from seeking to protect its population 
against addiction.32 
 
 The anti-democratic impact of the East India Company extended 
to England itself. Showing that wealthy corporations can gain 
influence without engaging in expensive modern political 
campaigns featuring TV advertisements, the East India Company 
held considerable sway over the English Parliament---one quarter of 
whose members at various points owned stock in the company.33 
This proved handy when, a few years after its stock price soared by 
virtue of the pillage of the Bengal treasury, a dramatic shortfall in 
company revenues from Bengal resulted from ruinous taxation and 
famine in the province. This threatened the ability of the company 
to pay its debts, and, in turn, led to the collapse of banks across 
Europe. A government bailout followed.34 
 
 2. The Democratic Legacy of the American Colonial  
  Companies 
                                                 
 28 E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26. 
 29 E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 116. 
 30 E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26. 
 31 Id. 
 32 E.g., Soutik Biswas, How Britain's opium trade impoverished Indians, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49404024 (September 5, 2019).  
 33 E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26. 




 Before dismissing corporations as having had an entirely 
negative impact on democratic governance, it is worthwhile to look 
at American history and ask where some of our democratic 
traditions originated. In fact, most of the thirteen colonies that 
became the original United States began as corporations.35 While 
the operations of these corporations often included what we would 
now regard as egregious violations of human rights,36 these 
corporations also laid a foundation for democratic government in the 
United States. 
 
 One component of democratic governance in the United States is 
the existence of a written constitution.37 Scholars recognize that the 
experience with written corporate charters, which outlined the 
governance structure for companies establishing colonies in North 
America, played a central role in the American penchant for written 
constitutions.38 
 
 More broadly, the corporations that created the American 
colonies played a significant role in the establishment of 
representative democracy in this country. The high school version 
of U.S. history points to the Virginia House of Burgesses called in 
1619 as the first example of representative government among the 
colonists in what would become the United States.39 This 
development, however, occurred within the context of the 
governance of the corporations establishing the Virginia and other 
colonies in North America. 
 
 Early in the 1600s, James I granted charters for two companies to 
establish colonies in what would become the United States: in the 
south, what was known as the London or Virginia Company, and in 
the north, the Plymouth Company.40 The original charter of the 
London Company departed from the normal governance model for 
chartered companies insofar as James attempted to preserve power 
for himself to appoint the governing councils for the company (one 
in London and a local one in Virginia). This was soon supplanted by 
                                                 
 35 E.g., Nicholas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1407 
(2017). 
 36 Slavery and the theft of land from the indigenous population. 
 37 Of course, England’s development into a democracy based upon norms and traditions forming 
an unwritten constitution, coupled with the existence of numerous autocratic regimes established 
under written constitutions, raise the question as to how much a written constitution really 
contributes to democracy. 
 38 Bowie, supra note 35; William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution 1 ANN. 
AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 529 (1890). 
 39 E.g., Joshua J. Mark. House of Burgesses, WORLD HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA,  
https://www.worldhistory.org/House_of_Burgesses/ (Last modified February 24, 2021).  
 40 E.g., 2 John P. Davis, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 158-59 
(1905). London and Plymouth referred to where the organizers of the companies were from. 
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a charter establishing the more customary corporate governance 
model of periodic assemblies by the members of the company (those 
who we would now refer to as shareholders), who elected a governor 
and a board of assistants (what we would now refer to as a board of 
directors).41 
 
 This more democratic governance, however, occurred only in 
England, leaving the actual colony in Virginia under the control of 
a governor appointed by the shareholders in England rather than the 
colonists in Virginia. Tensions set off by this scheme resulted in the 
company establishing the House of Burgesses consisting of 
representatives sent from the plantations and towns in Virginia. The 
company codified this into a permanent arrangement in an ordinance 
the company adopted in 1621.42 Views vary as to whether the 
company based this representative scheme on the English 
Parliament or on its own governing structure with its elected board.43 
In either event, representative democracy in the United States gets it 
start in decisions by a corporation. 
 
 The corporate origins of American democracy took a somewhat 
different route in the north. As a result of various machinations, the 
Plymouth Company granted to a group forming the Massachusetts 
Bay Company some of the Plymouth Company’s land.44 The charter 
forming the Massachusetts Bay Company incorporated the same 
essential governance structure as the London Company and other 
chartered companies---periodic assemblies of the members to elect 
a board of assistants (directors) and a governor.45 There was one 
critical difference: The charter did not require the assemblies of the 
membership and the elected assistants to be in England. 
Accordingly, the members of the Massachusetts Bay Company---
who were using the company structure to further a religious and 
political agenda and accordingly consisted of members in the 
Puritan church---met in Massachusetts.46 As a result, the elected 
governing board of the Massachusetts Bay Company became, in 
effect, the Massachusetts colonial legislature. 
 
 The corporate charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company 
remained the governing constitution for the Massachusetts colony 
until 1691, when a new royal charter for the colony replaced the 
Massachusetts Bay Company’s corporate charter. The 1691 charter, 
however, preserved the existing governance structure, except that 
                                                 
 41 E.g., Id; Morey, supra note 38 at 538-541. 
 42 E.g., Id at 541-2. 
 43 Id at 543.  
 44 E.g., Bowie, supra note 35 at 1413-14. 
 45 E.g., Morey, supra note 38 at 549. 
 46 E.g., Bowie, supra note 35 at 1418-20. 
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the king thereafter appointed the colony’s governor.47 While James 
dissolved the London Company in 1624, the governance structure in 
Virginia established by the company’s 1621 ordinance remained and 
later served as a model for other colonies in Maryland and the 
Carolinas. The governance structure established by the 
Massachusetts Bay Company’s 1628 charter provided a model for 
other colonies in Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.48 
 
 3. Finding the Difference in the Internal versus the External 
 
 While it might be tempting to see the difference between the East 
India Company versus the London and Massachusetts Bay 
Companies as simply showing that the managers of some companies 
are evil and others are more well behaved, there is a more useful 
way to look at this. All of these companies followed an elected 
governance structure providing democratic accountability to their 
members. The difference arose in democratic accountability to those 
who had not invested in the companies. 
 
 While the East India Company’s management was accountable 
to the shareholders in England through the shareholders’ right to 
elect the company’s governing board,49 there was no such 
accountability to those governed by the company in India or 
impacted by the company’s activities in China. By contrast, a key 
moment for democracy in what would become the United States was 
the London and Massachusetts Bay Companies’ export of their own 
elected governance structure for use by the colonists in North 
America.50 No doubt, the identity of the colonists in North America 
as English was critical to this different treatment.51 All told, the 
examples of territorial governance by early corporations illustrate 
the dualism inherent in the internal and external aspects of the 
relationship between corporations and democracy.  
  
B. A Pair of Incorporation Paradoxes 
 
 1. The Easy Formation Paradox 
 
                                                 
 47 E.g., Morey, supra note 38 at 550.  
 48 Id at 544, 550, 552. 
 49 See, e.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note 27 at 87 (describing governance provisions in the East 
India Company charter). 
 50 It should be mentioned that these representative institutions reflected the cramped view of 
democracy of their time: The Virginia House of Burgesses was elected by property owning white 
males and membership in the Massachusetts Bay Company was only for members of the Puritan 
church. 
 51 See, e.g., Bowie supra note 35 at 1417-18 (charters of the Massachusetts Bay and other 
colonial companies commonly contained clauses granting Britons living under the corporation’s 
jurisdiction “all liberties and immunities of free and natural subjects” to reassure potential emigrants 




 The evolution of corporate law illustrates further dualism 
regarding the relationships between corporations and democracy. To 
begin with, one might ask why, if corporations pose such a potential 
threat to democracy, they are so easy to form. In fact, this is the 
result of a legal evolution designed to promote democratic values.  
 
 The earlier discussion of the East India Company and of the 
companies forming colonies in America referred to charters granted 
by Elizabeth I and James I, which established these corporations. 
This is because, for most of their history, corporations came into 
existence through a one-off act of the sovereign (decree by the 
monarch or bill enacted by the legislature) which granted a charter 
to establish each specific proposed corporation.52 The charter would 
indicate generally what the corporation was to do, the powers it 
would have and how it was to be governed.53 
 
 The discretionary authority to establish, or not, every corporation 
under this system gives the government (whether represented by the 
monarch or legislature) significant potential power to control 
corporations. The government can refuse to create the corporation 
unless convinced there is some good for the economy and society to 
come from doing so---indeed, business corporations were relatively 
scarce in England, let alone America, under this system.54 The 
refusal to grant charters to prospective competitors, especially when 
coupled with charters that gave exclusive privileges (monopolies), 
meant the government could control the economy by picking 
winners and losers (Elizabethan socialism). Unfortunately, the 
potential for corruption and entrenching the privileged of society 
(crony capitalism) is rife under such a system.55 
    
 Since the individual chartering system bespoke of royal 
prerogatives and tended to favor those with influence (the 
aristocracy), it is not surprising that the French revolutionary 
government seems to have pioneered the adoption of a law allowing 
anyone to form a corporation by complying with statutory 
formalities---in other words, replacing special chartering with what 
has come to be known as a general incorporation statute.56 Because 
the French experiment was short-lived and forgotten, New York 
likes to claim credit for pioneering general incorporation with its 
                                                 
 52 E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a 
Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 483 (2011). 
 53 J. Hurst, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1780–1970, 15–16 (1970). 
 54 E.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
Rev. 785, 792-94. 
 55 E.g., Eric Hilt, Early American Corporations and the State, in Lamoreaux & Novak, supra 
note 2, at _ (“legislative authority over access to corporate charters was one of the principal 
mechanisms by which wealthy and politically connected elites protected their interests”). 
 56 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 52 at 483. 
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1811 statute, which allowed the formation of manufacturing 
corporations by compliance with statutory formalities rather than 
obtaining special legislation.57 
 
 The New York effort took hold and in the ensuing decades state 
after state in the United States,58 as well as other nations,59 adopted 
general incorporation statutes. In substantial part, the motive in the 
United States remained similar to the French revolutionary law. 
Even if dealing with elected state legislatures rather than a 
monarchy, the special chartering system was perceived as anti-
democratic by favoring the well-connected instead of being equally 
available to all.60 Still, the early general incorporation laws in the 
United States were often highly restrictive and thus many 
individuals desiring to establish corporations went to state 
legislatures for special charters.61 Gradually during the course of the 
1800s the combined effect of liberalized general incorporation 
statutes and the enactment of state constitutional provisions curbing 
the legislatures’ power to grant special charters ended the use of 
specially chartered corporations instead of formation under the 
general incorporation statutes in the United States.62 
 
 The irony, of course, is that this effort to democratize 
corporations by making them an easily available form for 
conducting business meant that corporations proliferated.63 This, in 
turn, allowed corporations to become the dominant form for 
conducting larger businesses64 and leads us to the subject matter of 
this article: The fear that they pose a threat to democracy. 
 
 2. The Success Paradox 
 
 The fact that corporations are easy to form does not in itself, 
however, account for their popularity---after all partnerships are 
even easier to form.65 Instead, several attributes make corporations 
an attractive form particularly for conducting larger businesses. 
 
                                                 
 57 See, e.g., Hilt, supra note 55 at _ (explaining that general incorporation for business 
corporations started with manufacturing, because this was less controversial than general 
incorporation in more politically sensitive fields such as banking); Lawrence M. Friedman, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW _ (2d ed. 1985) (New York’s 1811 law is usually credited as the first 
general incorporation statute for business, rather than non-profit, corporations). 
 58 E.g., Id at 188-98. 
 59 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 52 at 484-85. 
 60 E.g., Hilt, supra note 55 at _; Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 2, at _ . 
 61 Id at _. 
 62 Id at _. 
 63 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 2-3 (2010) (pointing to data 
showing that far more corporations than other forms of businesses, excluding sole proprietorships, 
have filed income tax returns in the United States). 
 64 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8 at 1. 
 65 See, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 74 Cal. App. 4th 442, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (1999) (partnership 
formed without the parties apparently realizing that they had done so). 
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 The first of these attributes---embodied in the very term 
“corporation”---is the concept of a legal person able to own 
property, enter contracts and survive the coming and going of 
individuals benefitting from and carrying out its activities. This 
corporate attribute long predates the business corporation and 
reflects the need to use property in various communal activities---be 
this the common land or gathering hall used by a town or the 
cathedral used by a church. Ownership of the property by the 
individual inhabitants of the town or officials of the church creates 
an obvious problem as the individuals die or otherwise cease 
involvement with the community activity. Hence, medieval 
Europeans, picking up terminology and concepts from Roman law, 
sought and received charters from their kings creating town, church 
and other corporations able to own property.66 The charters for the 
early business corporations, such as the East India Company, picked 
up this attribute by referring to the company as a body corporate and 
empowering the company to own property and the like.67 
 
 The earlier discussion of the East India Company already 
mentioned its pioneering role in establishing what is referred to as a 
joint stock company. Indeed, much of the world refers to what we 
in the United States call a corporation as a “stock company” or some 
variant thereof.68 This reflects a second attribute of the business 
corporation---ownership through freely transferable fungible shares 
of stock. 
 
 The English East India Company was part of a metamorphosis 
from so-called regulated companies---essentially guilds whose 
membership consisted of merchants conducting independent 
operations under the company’s exclusive government-granted 
franchise---into joint stock companies in which voting power and 
economic return came from investing in the capital funding the 
company’s business (the joint stock) in exchange for fungible shares 
in the joint stock (thereby making one a shareholder or 
stockholder).69 The Dutch (or United) East India Company---
chartered a couple of years after the English company---took this 
arrangement a critical step further by making the shares fully 
transferable to any buyer.70 The liquidity this provided meant that 
investors in the Dutch company did not have to wait literally for 
their “ships to come in” to obtain any money. The buying and selling 
                                                 
 66 E.g., Blair, supra note 54 at 788-790. 
 67 See, e.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note 27 at 87. 
 68 Franklin A. Gevurtz, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 4 (2006) 
 69 E.g., 1 William Robert Scott, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND 
IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, 155-58 (1912); M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-
Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74 (1939).  
 70 E.g., Dari-Mattiacci supra note 23 at 194. 
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of freely tradeable stock first by the Dutch and then others led to the 
organization of stock markets.71 
 
 The third attribute making the corporate form of business 
attractive is limited liability for the shareholders---meaning the 
shareholders are not personally liable for the company’s debts. 
While modern discussions of business form often treat this as the 
most important advantage for the corporation over other business 
forms,72 limited liability is the most recent attribute to arrive on the 
scene---for example, not being part of California’s corporate law 
until 1931.73 
 
 While these attributes make the corporate form attractive, 
especially for operating large, capital intensive businesses, they 
create another paradox from the standpoint of corporations and 
democracy. The ability of corporations to hold property as the 
company’s owners come and go, and to raise capital from large 
numbers of investors who retain liquidity by being able to resell their 
shares in stock markets and who are not deterred from investing by 
fear of personal liability, all combine to make the corporation a 
highly efficient vehicle for conducting large scale economic 
activities contributing to economic growth.74 Success in these 
activities increases the wealth held by the corporation. This success 
and accumulation of corporate wealth, however, creates potential 
political influence and the fear that wealthy and powerful 
corporations can become a threat to democracy.75 
 
 Early corporate statutes in the United States reflected this fear by 
imposing limits designed to curb corporate wealth and power. Early 
general incorporation statutes often set a maximum capital that the 
corporation could raise.76 In addition, Nineteenth Century court 
opinions held it was beyond the power of a corporation to own stock 
in other corporations,77 thereby limiting the growth of the powerful 
corporate groups operating in diverse fields that we see today. This 
changed after the Civil War. State corporate law limits on corporate 
power collapsed as a result of competition between states seeking 
                                                 
 71 E.g., Lodewijk Petram, THE WORLD'S FIRST STOCK EXCHANGE: HOW THE AMSTERDAM 
MARKET FOR DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY SHARES BECAME A MODERN SECURITIES MARKET, 
1602–1700 (Translated from the Dutch by Lynne Richards 2014). 
 72 E.g., James D. Cox & Thomas L. Hazen, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW 7 (4th ed. 2016) (“A 
primary advantage is the shareholders’ limited liability.”) 
 73 E.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 597-98 
(1986). 
 74 E.g., John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a 
Revolutionary Idea xv (2005); Ralph Gomory & Richard Sylla, The American Corporation, 
DÆDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 101, 102 (Spring 2013).  
 75 E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 113. 
 76 E.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-554 (1933) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
 77 E.g., Alfred D. Chandler Jr., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 323 (1977). 
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revenue from in-state incorporation.78 Moreover, many opinion 
makers were inclined to see economic concentration as both 
inevitable and desirable—a source of economic prosperity, rather 
than something to be feared.79 
 
 The history of corporations and corporate law also showed that 
corporate failure provided as much ground for fear as did corporate 
success. Specifically, limited liability means leaving creditors of 
failed corporations unpaid.80 More importantly, the Dutch invention 
of transferable stock and stock markets has led to a never-ending 
boom and bust cycle with economic downturns following stock 
market crashes81---as most dramatically illustrated by the Great 
Depression following the 1929 crash. All told, we end up with a 
“Goldilocks problem”: We seem to want corporations to be 
successful, but not too successful. 
 
III. THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATE OR SHAREHOLDER 
DEMOCRACY 
 
 Another common attribute of corporations is governance under 
the ultimate authority of a board of directors elected by the 
shareholders.82 While the presence of numerous shareholders with 
freely tradable stock creates the need for central management---in 
other words, it makes direct management by all of the shareholders 
impractical---the notion that this central management should take 
the more democratic form of representatives elected by the 
shareholders, rather than following a more autocratic structure, is 
not inherent. Indeed, there are businesses in which persons invest in 
which they do not elect the managers.83 While it is common to refer 
to the elected corporate governance structure as corporate or 
shareholder democracy,84 the degree to which either the actualities 
of this structure or the rationales behind it reflect democratic values 
exhibits the dualism running throughout the relationship between 
corporations and democracy. 
                                                 
 78 Liggett, 288 U.S. at 567-564. 
 79 E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. 
VA. L. REV. 173, 190-97 (1986). 
 80 It is debatable, however, whether there would be less negative economic consequences to the 
economy if the shareholders had to pay these debts. 
 81 E.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities 
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 403-17 (2006). 
 82 See note 8 supra. 
 83 As commonly the case with a limited partnership. See, e.g., Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act, Prefatory 
Note (2003) (purpose of the new Uniform Limited Partnership Act is to provide a form of business 
for people who want strong central management, strongly entrenched, and passive investors with 
little control). 
 84 E.g., Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1363 (2006) (referring to “shareholder 
democracy”); David L. Ratner, Government of Business Corporations: Critical 





A. Corporate or Shareholder Democracy as a Shining City on a 
 Hill 
 
 Events in recent years have suggested that the potential threat to 
democracy posed by corporate influence may pale in comparison to 
a couple of other threats: (1) efforts to game districting and election 
mechanics for political advantage (gerrymandering and voter 
suppression); and (2) the proliferation of ever more brazen false or 
misleading statements from political leaders and their allies. 
Corporate law contains rules attacking these sorts of threats when 
they involve corporate elections. Such rules, however, are probably 
infeasible for non-corporate elections. Hence, corporate or 
shareholder democracy starts off with a significant advantage. 
 
 1. Judicial Intervention against Gaming Corporate  
  Elections 
 
 While gerrymandering or otherwise gaming the mechanics of 
non-corporate elections is as old as the republic,85 recent events have 
focused renewed attention on the dangers such practices pose to 
democracy.86 
 
 Legal limits in the United States on such conduct are often 
indirect. For many years, the most promising line of attack 
commonly has been to characterize the districting or other conduct 
as racial discrimination violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965.87 
The problem with this approach occurs when the racial 
discriminatory aspect of the action is incidental to a partisan 
purpose. In other words, the Jim Crow laws sought to disenfranchise 
African Americans because they were African Americans regardless 
of how they would vote.88 By contrast, efforts to suppress the vote 
of those likely to support an opposition political party only establish 
an issue of racial discrimination insofar as partisan affiliations 
correlate with racial identity. But this raises the question of whether 
                                                 
 85 E.g., Elmer Griffith, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (1907) (discussing 
gerrymanders early in American history). 
 86 E.g., Sheldon H. Jacobson, Gerrymandering and restricting voting rights: Flip sides of the 
same coin, THE HILL https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/560995-gerrymandering-and-restricting-
voting-rights-flip-sides-of-the-same-coin (July 1, 2021); David Daley, Inside the Republican Plot for 
Permanent Minority Rule, THE NEW REPUBLIC https://newrepublic.com/article/159755/republican-
voter-suppression-2020-election (October 15, 2020). 
 87 52 U. S. C. §10301. Whether this will change after the Supreme Court’s Brnovich decision 
remains to be seen. 
 88 E.g., Brian K. Landsberg,  FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: ALABAMA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 12, 23 (2007); Malia Brink, Fines, Fees, and the Right to Vote, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/voting-
rights/fines--fees--and-the-right-to-vote/ (February 9, 2020)(“In 1890, Mississippi held a state 
constitutional convention. The president of the convention declared its purpose plainly: ‘We came 
here to exclude the Negro’….”). 
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motive or effect is to be the test,89 and, if effect is to be the test,90 
then how much of an effect is necessary.91 
 
 Even beyond claims of racial discrimination, judicial intervention 
against gaming non-corporate elections often requires fitting the 
challenged conduct into a framework focused on equal rights and 
the like for individual voters, which can miss the real issues 
presented by electoral tactics designed to frustrate democratic 
accountability.92 
 
 By contrast, Delaware courts have developed a much more direct 
doctrine allowing judicial intervention to prevent incumbents from 
gaming the system to gain advantages in corporate elections. This 
began with the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Schnell v. 
Chris–Craft Industries, Inc.93 
 
 Schnell arose out of a contested election for positions on Chris-
Craft Industries’ board of directors. The incumbent directors learned 
that a dissident group of shareholders intended to solicit their fellow 
shareholders to grant proxies---elections of directors for publicly 
held corporations normally taking place through voting by 
proxies94---for an alternate slate to replace the incumbents at the 
next annual shareholders meeting. The incumbents responded by 
amending Chris-Craft’s bylaws to advance the date of the annual 
meeting by approximately a month. At the same time, the board 
stalled giving the dissident group access to the corporation’s list of 
shareholders (making it difficult to know whom to solicit for 
proxies). The combined impact was to dramatically undercut the 
challengers’ chances of unseating the incumbents at the annual 
meeting. 
 
 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the change in meeting 
date should be enjoined. In doing so, the court explained that even 
though the corporation’s bylaws and Delaware’s corporation statute 
authorized the directors to change the meeting date, courts have the 
power to prevent incumbents from using such authority to gain an 
inequitable advantage in an election. Schnell thus created a 
foundation for judicial intervention against inequitable actions by 
incumbents to game corporate election contests. 
                                                 
 89 E.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (holding Voting Rights Act not 
violated by discriminatory effect without discriminatory motive). 
 90 52 U. S. C. §10301(b) (as amended) (overturning Bolden).  
 91 See, e.g., Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U.S. _ (2021) (substantially 
constricting the degree to which racially discriminatory impact establishes a violation of the Voting 
Rights Act). 
 92 E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the 
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).  
 93 285 A.2d 437 (Del.1971).  




 Condemning actions in corporate election contests because they 
are “inequitable” does not exactly give much guidance for 
determining what is condemned. It was the Delaware Chancery 
(trial) Court’s decision in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.95 
that provided a standard, thus gaining for the lower court naming 
rights over the resulting doctrine. Specifically, the court in Blasius 
adopted a rule requiring the directors to meet a heavy burden of 
demonstrating a compelling justification for any action taken to 
interfere with the shareholders’ ability to select the directors.96 The 
court held that even the good faith fear of harmful consequences for 
the corporation from the action proposed by a shareholder seeking 
to have its nominees become a majority of the board97 was not such 
a justification. While Blasius was only a decision by the Delaware 
Chancery Court, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently 
followed Blasius’ compelling justification test.98 
 
 2. The Ban on False or Misleading Communication in  
  Corporate Elections 
    
 In campaigns involving federal, state, and local elections, charges 
and countercharges between candidates, and for and against various 
ballot propositions, which, if not outright false, are at least 
misleading, have long seemed to be the norm. The remedy for those 
in the arena is to respond with denials and perhaps by hurling more 
scurrilous charges at one’s opponent in retaliation. A hope has been 
that news media could set some boundaries by exposing the worst 
lies.99 Unfortunately, studies report mixed results on media fact 
checking100 and opinion polls often seemingly support the sad 
insight of Goebbels and Orwell that, for many, the big lie, frequently 
repeated in simple language, can trump the facts.101 
                                                 
 95 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 96 The board amended the corporation’s bylaws to increase the board’s size to the maximum 
number allowed by the company’s certificate of incorporation and filled the vacancies. This “board 
packing” scheme preempted the ability of a dissident shareholder to have the shareholders expand 
the board and fill the vacancies with the dissident’s nominees. 
 97 The plaintiff shareholder proposed a large distribution of money from the corporation to its 
shareholders. 
 98 MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). 
 99 See, e.g., Darrell M. West, How to combat fake news and disinformation, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/ (December 18, 
2017) (“It is important for news organizations to call out fake news and disinformation without 
legitimizing them.”). 
 100 E.g., Alexander Agadjanian, et al, Counting the Pinocchios: The Effect of Summary Fact-
Checking Data on Perceived Accuracy and Favorability of Politicians, https://cpb-us-
e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/5/2293/files/2021/03/summary-fact-checking.pdf (last 
visited July 2, 2021).  
 101 E.g., Chris Cillizza, 1 in 3 Americans believe the ‘Big Lie’, 
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/21/politics/biden-voter-fraud-big-lie-monmouth-poll/index.html (June 
21, 2021) (discussing opinion polls showing that 32% of those polled believe unfounded claims by 





 By contrast, corporate law has long prohibited directors and 
others from making false or misleading statements in soliciting votes 
from shareholders. This prohibition exists in both state102 and 
federal law. The federal prohibition stems from Section 14(a) of the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act.103 
 
 The Securities Exchange Act is part of the New Deal legislation 
and reflects the traditional view that the 1929 stock market crash 
triggered the Great Depression. Hence, the Act contains a variety of 
provisions designed to increase confidence in the stock market and 
prevent abuses which Congress believed led to the crash.104 Section 
14(a), however, has a bit of a different focus. It responds to the 
concern that the practical powerlessness of shareholders in the 
governance of publicly held corporations, in part because of 
problems with proxy voting, contributed to poor performance by 
large corporations and, therefore, the country’s economic 
problems.105 Accordingly, the Section empowers the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to adopt regulations governing the 
solicitation of proxies to vote shares in publicly traded corporations. 
 
 Among the regulations promulgated by the SEC pursuant to 
Section 14(a) is Rule 14a–9.106 Rule 14a-9 prohibits proxy 
solicitations which contain any false statements as to material facts-
--in other words, facts a reasonable shareholder would find 
important in deciding how to vote.107 It also prohibits proxy 
solicitations which omit material facts when the omission makes the 
statements in the solicitation misleading or no longer correct. 
Solicitations potentially include any communication intended to 
lead shareholders to grant or withhold a proxy.108 Violations of Rule 
14a-9 trigger a variety of enforcement provisions under the Act.109 
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that shareholders have an 
implied private right of action against those violating the Rule.110 
 
 3. Why these Rules Work in Corporate, but not General, 
  Elections 
 
                                                 
 102 E.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del.1977). 
 103 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a). 
 104 See, e.g., Id at § 78b (statement of necessity for federal regulation of securities markets). 
 105 See, e.g., Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932) (a highly influential work setting out this thesis not long before the enactment of 
the Securities Exchange Act). 
 106 17 CFR § 240.14a-9. 
 107 E.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 108 E.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.1985). 
 109 E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C § 78u(d) (empowering the SEC to bring civil 
actions to enjoin violation of the Act); § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (criminal liability for those who 
willfully violate the Act).  
 110 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
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 Tempting as it might be to write an article advocating the import 
of these rules from corporate to non-corporate elections, the bottom 
line is that this is probably infeasible. For one thing, while Rule 14a-
9 presumably falls within the doctrine that the First Amendment 
does not protect untruthful commercial speech,111 importing a ban 
on false or misleading speech into the context of non-corporate 
elections is probably unconstitutional because of the much higher 
protection accorded to political and public issue speech.112 
 
 The fundamental problem with importing these corporate law 
rules into the non-corporate election context, however, is not 
doctrinal, but practical. Specifically, who will determine whether a 
statement is false or misleading, or if a party’s drawing of district 
lines or otherwise carrying out election mechanics is inequitable (or 
interferes with the voters’ ability to select their government without 
compelling justification)? 
 
 It is not uncommon for judges to have some partisan leaning, 
especially given the process of their selection, and, even if they do 
not, judges must be wary of the perception that their actions are 
based upon such a leaning.113 Hence, judges understandably tend to 
look for clear-cut, objective standards when entering into politically 
charged litigation involving contested non-corporate elections.114 
Vague standards like inequitably disenfranchise voters, or even 
interference with the effectiveness of the vote without compelling 
justification, are not such standards.115 Even the determination of 
whether a campaign statement is false or misleading often can be 
clouded by one’s political views.116  
                                                 
 111 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 556 
(1980) (to qualify for First Amendment protection, commercial speech must “concern lawful activity 
and not be misleading”). Actually, the characterization of Rule 14a-9 as addressing commercial 
speech is debatable. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech 
and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163 (1994). The prohibition in the securities laws of 
false or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities squarely falls 
within the regulation of commercial speech, which normally refers to advertising and the like 
designed to entice persons into buying goods or services. See Larson v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1285-1286 (2011). It seems more difficult to characterize the 
solicitation of proxies for election to a corporate board as commercial speech, unless one argues that 
a key attribute of any investment is the personnel who will manage the investment (the directors in 
the case of a corporation) and so regulating of the selection of directors is still regulation of 
commercial transactions rather than pure speech.  
 112 E.g., Staci Lieffring, Note: First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly 
False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (2013). 
 113 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Book Review: The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma: Law 
and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019) (discussing the tension 
between the Court’s desire to maintain legitimacy in the public’s eyes through “sociological 
legitimacy” (results do not consistently favor one ideological or political side over the other) and 
“legal legitimacy” (results follow a consistently applied legal approach)). 
 114 E.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019) (requiring a “clear, manageable 
and politically neutral” test for the Court to interfere in legislative redistricting). 
 115 See, e.g., id at 2500 (rejecting “fairness” as a test for judicial review of legislative districting). 
 116 See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and Marketing to Promote 




 This problem is largely absent in corporate law because judges 
presumably have less inherent bias in contests among the 
shareholders and directors of a particular corporation. In other 
words, to adopt these corporate law rules for non-corporate 
elections, we might need to have judges who were not themselves 
part of the body politic---perhaps aliens from another planet or an 
A.I. Put more seriously, the normal separation between judges and 
the corporate body politic creates an inherent advantage for the 
enforcement of democratic norms in corporate versus non-corporate 
elections. 
 
B. The Anti-Democratic Side of Corporate or Shareholder 
 Democracy 
 
 While corporate or shareholder democracy might look good from 
a distance, closer examination reveals fundamental flaws.  
 
 1. Technical Failings 
 
 Discussions of anti-democratic aspects of corporate or 
shareholder democracy often focus on narrow electoral 
mechanics.117 A good example involves access to the corporation’s 
solicitation of proxies. 
 
 As mentioned earlier, shareholder voting in a publicly held 
corporation typically will involve the use of proxies. In other words, 
shareholders---few of whom normally would wish to spend the 
money or time to travel to a shareholder meeting---will grant 
authority (a proxy) to vote their stock to someone who will attend. 
Commonly, this would be a representative selected by those in 
charge of the corporation. Indeed, those in charge of the corporation 
typically will have the company solicit the shareholders to grant 
such proxies, as otherwise not enough shareholders will be present 
to have a quorum.118 
 
 This solicitation, paid for by the corporation, will also typically 
request that the shareholders grant authority to vote for a list of 
nominees for election to the board. A committee of the current board 
                                                 
(“the Court has continued to recognize that commercial speech is different [from other speech] in 
that governments have greater ability to determine the truth or falsity of commercial speech”) 
 117 E.g., Kim, supra note 9 at 336-341(looking at who can call shareholder meetings; what items 
shareholders vote on; the ability of shareholders to nominate and remove directors; and the ability of 
shareholders to bring actions for breach of fiduciary duty); Bebchuk, supra note 9 at 696-706 
(recommending reforms to provide proxy access, reimbursement of challenger expenses, majority 
rather than plurality vote to elect directors; and confidential voting). 




typically selects these nominees and thus, not surprisingly, these 
nominees are mostly the current incumbents.119 Those wishing to 
run against the board’s nominees normally must solicit proxies on 
their own dime.120 Indeed, the form to grant a proxy in the 
solicitation paid for by the corporation looks a lot like the ballot in 
old Soviet Union, which listed only the Communist Party’s 
candidate for any given office and provided only the “choice” of 
voting yes (da) or no (nyet) on the Party’s nominee.121  
 
 In recent years, there have been efforts to change this system so 
that the names of competing candidates for election to the board 
appear on the form for granting a proxy distributed by the 
corporation and to require the person exercising the proxy to vote 
shares for whichever candidates the shareholders instruct. This is 
referred to as proxy access.122 At the urging of institutional and 
activist shareholders, many public companies have adopted bylaws 
providing for proxy access.123 Yet, many of the common limits in 
these proxy access bylaws, such as preventing the use of proxy 
access to run a slate of candidates for more than a small fraction of 
the board,124 seem to have little basis in democratic norms. 
 
 Beyond these private efforts, a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act 
specifically authorizes the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule.125 
Ironically, in Business Roundtable v. SEC,126 the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals struck down the rule the SEC came up with based upon 
flaws the court found with the SEC’s assessment of the rule’s costs 
versus benefits---an anti-democratic bit of judicial activism which 
effectively ignored the Congressional mandate.127 
 
 Anti-democratic election mechanics, such as limited proxy 
access, can be highly significant in undercutting corporate or 
shareholder democracy. Indeed, the financial advantage of 
incumbents in soliciting proxies at corporate expense, while 
                                                 
 119 E.g., Id at 112. While stock exchange rules require the board to have a nominating committee 
consisting of so-called independent directors (N.Y.S.E. Rule 303A), there is no evidence this has led 
to a substantial change in the practice of renominating incumbents. 
 120 See note 128 infra. 
 121 See, e.g., Rule 14a-4, 17 CFR § 240.14a-4 (the form for granting a proxy must provide a 
means for the shareholder to indicate whether the shareholder is granting or withholding authority to 
vote for each director for whom the party soliciting the proxy wishes to vote).  
 122 E.g., Holly J. Gregory, et. al, The Latest on Proxy Access, HARV. L.S. FOR. CORP. GOV., 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu (February 1, 2019). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 126 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 127 Curiously, this decision never discusses the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act expressly 
authorized the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule. One might have assumed that this action tells us 
that Congress concluded the benefits of proxy access as a general matter outweigh its costs. Hence, 
unless the SEC’s rule was so beyond the scope of what Congress envisioned as to call for a 
reweighing of costs and benefits, that should have settled the matter. 
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challengers must (at least unless they win128) foot the expenses for 
soliciting their own proxies, explains in part why corporate elections 
are rarely contested.129 The lack of contested corporate elections, in 
turn, means that, as a practical matter, a self-perpetuating oligarchy 
ends up in control over most of the largest corporations.130 Yet, the 
anti-democratic mechanics for carrying out corporate elections 
might be small potatoes---because it would not require radical 
change to fix131---next to the fundamentally anti-democratic nature 
of shareholder democracy itself. 
 
 2. The Anti-Democratic Pay-to-Play Essence of  
  “Shareholder Democracy” 
 
 In fact, the most anti-democratic feature of corporate or 
shareholder democracy is the shareholder part. To see why, it might 
be helpful to briefly ask what we mean when we say something is 
democratic or undemocratic. 
 
  a. What Is Democratic? 
 
 Determination of what is democratic or anti-democratic or what 
are democratic values and norms can become quite complicated and 
contentious. At its most basic, democracy means rule by the 
people.132 This, however, begs as many questions as it answers. To 
begin with, in any sizeable group, having the overall populace make 
the governing decisions is largely impractical. Hence, democracy 
commonly becomes equated with a republican system in which the 
overall populace elects those who are in charge.133 
 
 This, in turn, leads to a focus on the laws establishing, and the 
implementation of, procedures for elected government. One simple 
definition along this line is that a democracy exists if there have been 
two changes of the government through free and fair elections and 
                                                 
 128 Since courts will not order a corporation to reimburse a shareholder’s proxy solicitation 
expenses (Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., 49 Misc.2d 322, 267 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d., 27 
A.D.2d 646, 276 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1966)) the challengers must normally win control over the board to 
get the directors to vote to pay their expenses. Even then, however, courts might hold that the 
corporation cannot reimburse the expenses. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane 
Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955) (suggesting that the corporation cannot reimburse 
expenses unless the contest involved a policy dispute).  
 129 E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9 at 682-691 (documenting the infrequency of challenges to 
incumbent directors and explaining why proxy expenses contribute to this result). This can get worse 
if corporate bylaws attempt to limit proxy solicitation expenditures challengers are allowed to make 
even on their own dime. For a discussion and a proposal to import into corporate law the Buckley 
doctrine barring caps on political expenditures, see Andrew A. Schwartz, Financing Corporate 
Elections, 41 J. CORP. L. 863 (2016). 
 130 E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 114. 
 131 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9 at 695-706 (setting out proposals to improve corporate 
elections). 
 132 E.g., Cary Coglianese, Book Review: Democracy and Its Critics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1662 
(1990). 
 133 E.g., The Federalist No. 10, at 82 (James Madison). 
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there is no realistic threat to democracy from an authoritarian 
government.134 Much seems missing in such a definition. For 
instance, are elections free and fair if those in power control the 
media and harass efforts by opponents to organize opposition 
parties? This leads to lists, such as the often-cited lists put together 
by Robert Dahl: universal suffrage; elected representatives; free, 
fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative 
sources of independent information; associational autonomy; and 
inclusive citizenship.135 
 
 Some social scientists think the focus on elections (the formal 
procedures of democracy) too narrow. Presumably going back to the 
elemental notion that democracy is rule by the people, Charles Tilly 
suggests defining democracy as “conformity of a state’s behavior to 
it citizens’ express demands” ---which he measures as the degree 
that relations between the citizens and the state feature “broad, 
equal, protected136 and mutually binding consultation.”137 
 
 For present purposes it is unnecessary to choose between these 
approaches. Instead, it is sufficient to draw out a pair of core 
democratic values common to them. 
 
 The first goes to who is entitled to vote in elections (in the 
narrower formulation) or participate in the political process as a 
citizen (in the broader formulation). Both equate democracy with the 
breadth of those holding political rights: Dahl’s list begins with 
universal suffrage, while Tilly’s first factor is the breadth of the 
adults enjoying citizenship rights. Of course, many nations that are 
the forebearers of democracy (including our own) fell far short of 
universal suffrage and, indeed, not that long ago many influential 
voices would have contested the equation of democracy with 
universal suffrage.138 Still, since human institutions are inherently 
imperfect, democracy is commonly a matter of more versus less 
rather than it is or is not.139 Seen in this light, a wider franchise is 
more democratic while a narrower franchise is less democratic.140 
Hence, the history of an expanding right to vote in the United States 
has been a move from lesser toward greater democracy.141 
 
                                                 
 134 Samuel P. Huntington, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATISATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 267 (1993). 
 135 Robert A. Dahl, ON DEMOCRACY 85-86, 93-99 (1997). 
 136 In the sense that citizens can express views without fear of retaliation. 
 137 Charles Tilly, DEMOCRACY 13-14 (2007). 
 138 E.g., id at 9. 
 139 E.g., id at 10; Robert A. Dahl, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY ix (2006). 
 140 E.g., Tilly, supra note 137 at 14. 
 141 E.g., id. 
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 Overlapping with the notion of a broadly held ability to 
participate as a citizen (vote) is the notion of equality in electoral 
power among the citizens (voters). This is Tilly’s second criteria, 
while Dahl addresses a book to the topic.142 For those preferring 
judicial authority, the Supreme Court recognized this democratic 
value in its one-person, one-vote decisions: “The concept of ‘we the 
people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters 
but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.”143 
Actually, the breadth and equality values are two sides of the same 
core difference between democracy and other forms of government: 
Democracy rejects the notion behind all other forms of government 
that some individuals have a greater claim to decision making power 
than others (except, of course, insofar as that decision making power 
traces to democratic election). 
 
  b. Why Shareholder “Democracy” Is Not 
 
 Looking at these two central democratic values, shareholder 
democracy misses the mark by a wide margin.144 The principal 
features of shareholder democracy are that the franchise is limited 
to the shareholders and that voting power is based upon how many 
shares one owns rather than one-person, one-vote.145 Both the 
limited franchise and the unequal voting power among shareholders, 
in turn, are symptomatic of a more fundamental departure of 
shareholder democracy from democracy. Essentially, shareholder 
democracy operates under a vote buying system: Persons buy into 
the franchise by purchasing shares and gain greater voting rights by 
purchasing more shares.146 
 
                                                 
 142 Dahl, supra note 139. 
 143 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368). But 
see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (exception 
for water district). There are a few explanations for the voter equality norm ranging from a human 
worth or dignity rationale to a belief in the “wisdom of crowds” (i.e., the larger number of 
individuals are more likely to reach the better decision). 
 144 E.g., Dahl, supra note 135 at 182; Pollman, supra note 10 at 675 (“Corporate governance 
does not meet [Dahl’s] standards [for democracy]. Not all corporate participants have voting rights, 
and those who do have unequal votes”). 
 145 While one-share, one-vote is the norm and default rule (e.g., Grant M, Hayden & Matthew T. 
Bodie, One-Share, One-Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 445, 447 (2008)), articles of incorporation often provide for classes of stock with different 
voting rights, such as non-voting shares or shares providing more than one vote per share. Id at 471. 
The impact of such multiple class schemes is typically to further deviate from the democratic value 
of equality among voters. 
 146 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
129, 137 (2009). Admittedly, corporate founders do more than simply buy their stock. Hence, their 
control rests on a different, even if still not democratic, basis. 
     A further deviation of shareholder democracy from democratic values arises from the ability of 
various entities---other corporations, investment funds and the like---to own and vote stock, since 
this means that individuals are making decisions on how to vote stock that they do not even own. 
The undemocratic nature of shareholder voting is glaring enough without getting into this further 
deviation from democratic values. 
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 We can demonstrate how this is the essence of shareholder voting 
by asking why employees do not get a vote. It is not because 
employees lack a significant stake in the decisions made by those 
governing the corporation: The impact of such decisions on 
employees is commonly greater than the impact on the typical public 
shareholder.147 It is not because employees do not contribute to the 
corporation: The corporation would not make money without them. 
Instead, it is because employees did not buy stock. In fact, if 
employees buy stock, they will get a vote.148 
 
 Corporate finance theory also supports the notion that the 
shareholder franchise is essentially a vote buying system. This is a 
corollary of the Modigliani and Miller dividend irrelevance theory. 
This theory holds that, putting aside potential impact on taxes and 
the like, corporate shareholders benefit equally from dividends or 
from the rise in the price of their stock as the corporation reinvests 
its earnings.149 The deeper implication of this theory is that the 
economic rights of stock ownership can just as well constitute 
simply a theoretical claim to a share of corporate earnings that a 
shareholder never needs to actually receive but can benefit from by 
someone else purchasing this theoretical claim to earnings, that this 
person will also never actually receive except by someone else 
purchasing this claim and on and on. In other words, shareholders 
can simply have pieces of paper (or a digital equivalent) that says 
this percentage of a wealth producing enterprise represents their 
shares, but they never actually need to see any distribution of the 
wealth produced by the enterprise. Under these circumstances, the 
only practical right of share ownership becomes the vote. 
 
 Yet, the notion that prospective voters should buy their votes is 
contrary to fundamental democratic values. As the Supreme Court 
recognized in striking down poll taxes, “wealth or fee paying has . . 
. no relation to voting qualifications.”150 In fact, shareholder 
democracy is worse than a poll tax, since the ability to buy more 
votes by purchasing more shares is the equivalent of having a poll 
tax in which voting power is proportionate to the amount of tax one 
is willing and able to pay.   
                                                 
 147 See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9 at 2473.  
 148 The prospect that employees could get votes in a publicly held corporation by purchasing 
stock does not provide a realistic mechanism for democratic accountability. Even if purchases of 
single shares (odd lot purchases) are a realistic option, the one-share, one-vote, rather than one-
person, one-vote, norm trivializes the voting impact of employees holding a single share. For 
employees to purchase larger amounts raises problems both with affordability as well as a dangerous 
lack of diversification of their investments. E.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and 
Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV. 69, 85-86 (2015). Ownership through employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs) or the like does not provide the employees themselves (rather than 
trustees) the vote. Id at 86-87. 
 149 Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961). 




 Indeed, there is a certain irony here insofar as a number of state 
corporate laws traditionally have prohibited so-called “vote buying” 
---in other words, paying shareholders to vote in an agreed way---in 
corporate elections.151 This seemingly mirrors (albeit without the 
criminal law consequences) the pretty universal rule in general 
elections in which it is illegal to pay voters to vote in a certain 
way.152 
 
 A seeming reconciliation of the vote buying ban in corporate law 
with the fact that people always buy votes in corporate elections by 
buying stock invokes concerns about the motivation for buying the 
right to vote without buying the stock impacted by how one votes.153 
This rationalization rings rather hollow, however, when one realizes 
that there are all sorts of arrangements under which persons can gain 
the right to vote stock and yet are insulated from the consequences 
to the corporation from their votes---what is sometimes referred to 
as “empty voting”.154 Moreover, it is not uncommon for 
corporations to have more than one class (type) of stock in which 
some classes might lack voting rights, or some classes might possess 
more than one vote per share---arrangements which are hardly 
consistent with the rationale that voting power should be 
proportionate to economic consequences.155 
 
C. Dualism in Thinking about Corporate or Shareholder 
 Democracy  
 
 The dualism in whether corporate or shareholder democracy is 
democratic parallels a dualism in the rationales advanced for having 
corporate or shareholder democracy. Specifically, is corporate 
governance simply about utilitarian economic outcomes or is a goal 
to provide democratic legitimacy for those with the power to govern 
large corporations? 
 
 1. Economics  
 
                                                 
 151 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(e); Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del.Ch. 
74, 194 A. 19 (1937). But see Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del.Ch.1982) (taking a more 
nuanced approach to vote buying in corporate elections). 
 152 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 597. 
 153 E.g., Thompson & Edelman, supra note _ at 162. See also Robert C. Clark, Voting Buying 
and Corporate Law, 29 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 776, 795-797 (1979) (discussing the concern 
about selling votes to buyers planning to loot the corporation). 
 154 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (discussing how the derivatives revolution 
in finance, combined with the growth of the share lending market, is making the decoupling of 
economic ownership from voting rights ever easier and cheaper). Indeed, through the ownership of 
various options or derivatives, it is possible for a person voting stock to profit from its decline in 
value. 
 155 E.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 145 at 480-82. 
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 The departure of shareholder democracy from core democratic 
values in large part mirrors a dominant strain in thinking about 
corporate governance. This views the topic through an 
instrumentalist lens concerned with economic outcomes rather than 
what is democratic. Interestingly, this is a common approach both 
for those rationalizing and promoting shareholder democracy and 
for those critical of it. 
 
  a. The Economic Efficiency Argument for  
   Shareholder Democracy 
 
 Large corporations, like other large organizations, involve joint 
activities organized in pyramidal hierarchies. Economists 
sometimes explain this as based upon avoiding the transaction costs 
that would otherwise exist if each and every good or service 
necessary to produce another good or service came from 
independent individuals constantly contracting with each other to 
supply each and every such good or service.156 The question then 
becomes who should stand at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. The 
economic efficiency argument is that this should be the person(s) 
with the best incentives. Those favoring shareholder democracy on 
such utilitarian reasoning assert that this is the shareholders. 
 
 This argument views shareholders as the so-called residual 
claimants in the corporation---in other words, they get what is left 
over after everyone else (employees, suppliers, lenders) gets paid.157 
Since the shareholders stand last in line to obtain assets from the 
corporation, the first dollar of corporate loss comes out of their 
pockets. Since the shareholders get everything made by the 
corporation after paying the other claimants, the last dollar of profit 
goes into their pockets. Hence, the argument runs, the shareholders’ 
interest matches the wealth maximizing or efficient result for the 
whole venture: investing until the next possible dollar of gain 
multiplied by the probability of obtaining it is less than the next 
possible dollar of loss multiplied by the probability of incurring it.158 
 
 While, under this view, the shareholders have the best incentives 
when making overall corporate decisions and monitoring the 
                                                 
 156 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Armen A. 
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777 (1972). There are variations in the precise explanations for the existence of firms 
but exploring this is unnecessary to the present discussion. 
 157 Actually, this view of the shareholders being the residual claimants has never been 
universally accepted. E.g., Summer Kim, A Multi-Criteria Assessment of Corporate Residual 
Claimants, working paper available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816061 (March 30, 2021) 
(discussing the historical and normative arguments for treating various stakeholders in a business as 
the residual claimant). 




supervisors at the top of the hierarchy carrying out such decisions, 
in a publicly held corporation the shareholders are too numerous and 
rationally disengaged to do this themselves.159 Therefore, the 
reasoning continues, shareholders should elect those (the board of 
directors) with the ultimate authority to make overall decisions and 
to monitor and replace, if necessary, the senior supervisors carrying 
out these decisions. In this manner, the board will be responsive to 
the interests of the shareholders and pursue the most wealth 
maximizing actions for the corporation.160 
 
 Indeed, under this sort of thinking it is even possible to applaud 
the whole vote buying idea of shareholder democracy. After all, if 
shareholders are too numerous and rationally disengaged to make 
overall decisions for, and carefully monitor what is going on at, their 
corporations, they are also normally too numerous and rationally 
disengaged to organize opposition seeking to oust underperforming 
directors and managers. It is easier to follow the so-called “Wall 
Street rule” of selling your shares if you do not like the 
management161---something that is much less practical for a citizen 
dissatisfied with his or her government and that further accounts for 
few corporate elections being contested. On the other hand, this 
creates the opportunity for those who think they can better manage 
the corporation to buy enough stock to gain control. Hence, vote 
buying through the purchase of stock can lead to greater efficiency 
by replacing poor management with better.162 
 
  b. Second Thoughts about Shareholder Interests 
 
 There has been considerable pushback against the view that 
giving primacy to shareholder interests, at least as shareholders 
often perceive their interests, produces the economically optimal 
decisions for corporations or for society more broadly. 
 
 A common example involves the incentives for shareholders 
when a corporation is at or near insolvency.163 If a corporation’s 
assets are less than, or even barely in excess of, its debts, then losing 
                                                 
 159 In other words, it is not worthwhile for any one shareholder with a small stake in a 
corporation to expend the time necessary to know what is going on in the business since the 
overwhelming bulk of the benefit from doing so will go to the other shareholders who did not bother 
to spend the time. Moreover, even if a shareholder did so, attempting to persuade the other 
shareholders of the merits of what the informed shareholder proposes would take further 
expenditures by the informed shareholder, as well as by the other shareholders to evaluate the 
information they receive. E.g., Clark, supra note 153 at 779-783. 
 160 E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 301, 311 (1983). 
 161 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8 at 236. 
 162 E.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 
259, 265-66 (1967). 
 163 E.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 
277613, *34 n.55 (Del. Ch.1991). 
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further money essentially only harms the creditors and not the 
shareholders. On the other hand, any earnings in excess of the debts 
will go to the shareholders. Under this circumstance, high risk 
investments (like bets at a roulette wheel) make sense from the 
shareholders’ standpoint. This will be true even though such 
investments have a net negative value (in that the magnitude of the 
possible loss from the investment, multiplied by the probability of 
the loss, exceeds the magnitude of the possible gain from the 
investment, multiplied by the probability of the gain) and so the 
investments are inefficient from an overall economic standpoint. 
 
 Examples of poor incentives for shareholders are not confined to 
nearly insolvent corporations. Many of these examples involve so-
called “short-termism”164 or other myopic decisions that might have 
an immediately favorable impact on the shareholders of a 
corporation but can have negative consequences when viewed over 
a longer-term or broader economic perspective. For example, tales 
of layoffs and moving plants in search of lower labor costs can 
discourage employees at all corporations from investing in 
developing firm-specific human capital (in other words, developing 
skills which are not completely transferable to another company). 
This can result in lower corporate efficiency across the economy 
even though the layoffs and plant moving increased the immediate 
wealth for the shareholders of the corporation that did it.165 
 
 More broadly, actions that favor the interests of shareholders over 
others impacted by corporate activities might not be optimal when 
viewed from a larger economic or social standpoint. Specifically, 
maximizing corporate profits for the benefit of shareholders would 
normally appear to call for lowering costs---including compensation 
and benefits for employees.166 It also normally calls for increasing 
revenues, including by increasing prices charged to consumers.167 In 
addition, it would call for taking advantage of externalities, say by 
lowering expenditures on safety or pollution control unless required 
by the government.168 Such actions can have negative consequences 
in terms of income inequality and sustainability that outweigh the 
gains to the shareholders when looked at in terms of broader 
economic and societal consequences. 
                                                 
 164 E.g., William Galston, Against Short-Termism, DEMOCRACY 
file:///Users/fgevurtz/Documents/Against%20Short-Termism%20_%20Democracy%20Journal.html 
(February 2014); Roger L. Martin, Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. 
https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem (October 9, 2014).  
 165 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 304-05 (1999). 
 166 E.g., Bodie, supra note 148 at 74. 
 167 Indeed, diversified shareholders presumably would prefer that corporations in which they 
hold stock not compete with each other. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Saying Yes: Reviewing Board 
Decisions to Sell or Merge the Corporation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437, 497 (2017).   




 Not surprisingly, many expressing concern about the negative 
economic or other consequences of giving primacy to shareholder 
interests are then led to express hostility to shareholder 
democracy169---including by opposing reforms such as proxy 
access.170 Interestingly, however, few such commentators appear to 
express opposition to democratic government in general. 
 
 2. Legitimacy 
 
 While this might be an unfair comparison, both sides of the 
economic-oriented narrative regarding corporate or shareholder 
democracy can remind one a bit of the apologists for Mussolini, who 
said that he “made the trains run on time.” Democracy does not 
necessarily find its justification in utilitarian economic 
considerations. Admittedly, one could say that business is all about 
economics. Yet, there is a democracy for its own sake thread in 
corporate governance thinking. 
 
  a. The Original Purpose for Elected Corporate 
   Boards 
 
 Indeed, this corporate democracy for its own sake notion is far 
older than the focus on economic outcomes. As mentioned earlier,171 
the joint-stock companies, like the East India Company, which are 
the forebears of the modern corporation, evolved out of so-called 
regulated companies. The regulated companies were little more than 
merchant guilds whose members had the exclusive right to conduct 
trade between England and areas such as the Baltic (for the Eastland 
Company) or Turkey (for the Levant Company).172 The members of 
the regulated companies typically elected boards of those who we 
would now refer to as directors.173 As the regulated companies 
evolved into the earliest joint stock companies, this model of an 
elected board went along for the ride---either as what started out as 
a regulated company turned into a joint stock company or as the 
early joint stock companies modeled the governance provisions in 
                                                 
 169 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 165 at 310-315 (favorably mentioning “practical and legal 
obstacles” to shareholders using their voting power). 
 170 E.g., Yvan Allaire & Francois Dauphin, Who Should Pick Board Members? Proxy Access by 
Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process 29, available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685790 (October 30, 2015); Martin Lipton & Steven A. 
Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 
BUS. LAW. 67, 70-71 (2003). 
 171 See note 69 and accompanying text supra. 
 172 E.g., Davis, supra note 40 at 88-89, 97-98; Cawston & Keane, supra note 22 at 61. 
 173 E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 117 (2004). 
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their charters on the governance provisions of the regulated 
companies.174 
 
 The regulated companies themselves, being essentially guilds, 
took the elected board governance model commonly used by 
guilds,175 which over time had replaced direct governance by all of 
the guild’s members with decision making by elected 
representatives.176 Moreover, given the close connection between 
the economic role and populace of medieval European towns and 
the merchants, the merchant guilds were closely connected with 
medieval European municipal governments.177 Hence, the parallel 
between the guild boards and the town councils, which developed 
after medieval towns became too large for meetings of the entire 
townsfolk.178 Moreover, to medieval European jurists, both guilds 
and towns were a universitates (essentially, a corporation) and, as 
such, were subject to common norms of governance with other 
corporations.179 These included political ideas and practices also 
manifested in medieval European parliaments and in Church 
councils.180 
  
 Among these political ideas and practices was the medieval 
European preference for expressions of consensus when making 
decisions impacting all members of the community.181 One 
manifestation of this preference occurred when Canon Law jurists 
turned a Roman Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus 
approbetur (“what touches all is to be approved by all”) from a 
technical rule involving co-tutorship into a broad principle of 
governance.182 This principle applied not only to the Church, but to 
other “corporations”---using the term in the broader sense of a 
collective group, including guilds and towns183---and was invoked 
in the summonses sent by kings demanding that representatives 
appear at a parliament.184 The role, then, of a board, council, or 
parliament was to have representatives with full power (plena 
                                                 
 174 Id at 115-122. T.S. Willan, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RUSSIA COMPANY, 1553-1603, 19-
21 (1956). 
 175 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 173 at 156-57. 
 176 E.g., id at 158-160; Cyril O’Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive, 26 BULL. BUS. 
HIST. SOC’Y 55, 63 (1952). 
 177 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 173 at 146-147. 
 178 Id at 141-144. See also Susan Reynolds, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN 
EUROPE 900-1300, 196 (1984) (noting that smaller towns retained open assemblies). 
 179 E.g., Antony Black, GUILDS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM 
THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 18-24 (1984). 
 180 Id at 44. 
 181 E.g., Reynolds, supra note 178 at 302-305. 
 182 Brian Tierney, Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, 52 CATHOLIC 
HISTORICAL REV. 1, 13 (1966). 
 183 E.g., Black, supra note 179 at 73. 
 184 E.g., Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, reprinted in Thomas N. Bisson, 
MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THEIR ORIGINS AND NATURE 147-48 (1973) (reciting 
the doctrine that “what touches all should be approved by all” in setting forth the purpose of the 
summons and commanding county, town, and ecclesial representatives to attend). 
34 
 
potestas) grant the consent required on behalf of the broader 
community.185 
 
 Indeed, it is fairly easy to see that consent of the governed, rather 
than economic efficiency, represented the original purpose for 
boards when we ask what exactly the board of a regulated company 
or guild did. These boards obviously did not manage a business or 
supervise those who did on behalf of passive investors. Rather, in 
addition to adjudicating disputes involving the merchants, these 
boards adopted ordinances to regulate the membership.186 For 
example, the board of the Eastland Company adopted a regulation 
prohibiting members from “colouring” goods---in other words, 
selling the goods of a nonmember merchant as a member’s own---
thereby circumventing the company’s monopoly.187 Hence, these 
boards reflected the essentially democratic notion that the members 
of a group should elect those who make decisions and rules 
governing the members of the group. 
 
  b. Contemporary Expressions 
 
 Even if elected board governance of corporations originated in 
democratic notions of consent of the governed, one might ask what 
this has to do with governance of the modern business corporation. 
In fact, the notion of legitimacy through a democratically elected 
government remains a thread in corporate governance thinking. One 
of the best articulations of this sort of thinking is found in the Blasius 
opinion discussed earlier.188 
 
 The directors in Blasius argued that the court should apply the 
deferential business judgment rule189 to their efforts blocking the 
plaintiff shareholder from obtaining majority control of the board. 
In rejecting this argument, Chancellor Allen (who had a substantial 
influence on Delaware corporate law despite not serving on the 
state’s Supreme Court) explained: 
 
                                                 
 185 Id (stating that the knights sent to parliament are to have “full and sufficient power for 
themselves and the community of aforesaid shire,” and the citizens and burghers sent to parliament 
are to have such power “for themselves and the community of cities and boroughs separately,” to do 
the business of parliament). It should be mentioned, however, that the medieval European concept of 
representatives to grant consent on behalf of the broader community did not necessarily mean that 
the representatives were democratically elected. 
 186 E.g., Willan, supra note 174, at 19-20; Gevurtz, supra note 173, at 120. 
 187 E.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 69 at 82. Indeed, some of the ordinances adopted by the boards 
of regulated companies or guilds did not involve the conduct of business at all---as, for example, in 
the case of an ordinance prohibiting members of the Merchant Adventurers (which had the exclusive 
right to trade between England and Calais) from marrying women not born in England. Davis, supra 
note _, at 80. Presumably, the Merchant Adventurers’ marriage limitation was to “promote domestic 
tranquility.” 
 188 See notes 95 through 97 and accompanying text supra. 
 189 For a discussion of the meanings attached to the business judgment rule, see Gevurtz, supra 
note 8 at 290-98. 
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 The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
 which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. . . . 
 
 It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the 
 stockholder vote as a  vestige or ritual of little practical 
 importance. . . . Be that as it may, however, whether the vote 
 is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an 
 important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the 
 theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors 
 and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not 
 own.190 
 
 Indeed, one wonders whether state legislatures would have 
enacted laws allowing for general incorporation, particularly at a 
time in which such laws reflected a fear of corporate power, without 
the patina of democratic legitimacy provided by governance under 
an elected board. 
 
IV. CORPORATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF 
SOCIETY AS A WHOLE 
 
A. Situating the Private Association within the Democratic  
 Governance of Society 
 
 1. The Impact of Corporations on Individuals in Society 
 
 Many who express support for democracy in general nevertheless 
might not much care about whether corporate governance adheres 
to democratic values.191 Such a view explicitly or implicitly draws a 
distinction between political entities (e.g., nations, states or 
provinces, cities) and private associations such as corporations. 
Under this view, how private associations choose to govern 
themselves is primarily a matter of private contracting and does not 
impact the question of whether the governance of society is 
democratic. In other words, this view rejects any linkage between 
the internal and external aspects of corporations and democracy. 
 
 This view, however, overlooks the normal operation of human 
societies. Human societies rarely exist as simply atomistic 
individuals living within political entities. Instead, societies consist 
of various associations among individuals.192 In addition to families, 
                                                 
 190 564 A.2d at 659. 
 191 E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 143 (2008) (“While notions of shareholder democracy permit powerful rhetoric, 
corporations are not New England town meetings. Put another way, we need not value corporate 
democracy simply because we value political democracy.”). 
 192 E.g., William Little, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY – 1ST CANADIAN EDITION Ch. 6 
Victoria, B.C.: BCcampus. https://opentextbc.c (2014). 
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this includes associations for both non-economic (such as religious) 
and economic purposes (including business corporations). The 
decisions of those governing such associations can have as much or 
more impact on the lives of individuals as the decisions of those in 
charge of political entities. 
 
 This is certainly the case with large corporations. The largest 
firms, almost all of whom are corporations,193 produce most goods 
and services in the United States.194 They employ the majority of the 
private sector workers.195 They pollute the environment196 and cause 
innumerable injuries.197 Their failure can bring down the 
economy.198 
 
 2. Democratic Consent or Accountability for Those  
  Governing Corporations 
 
 The fact that various associations, such as corporations, impact 
the lives of individuals does not mean they undermine the 
democratic governance of society unless they have an internal 
governance adhering to democratic norms. Families commonly do 
not govern themselves under such norms. Here is where one must 
consider the interaction of the internal and the external. What makes 
the impact and governance of private associations consistent with a 
democratic society is either (1) their internal governance under 
democratic norms; (2) the ability of individuals to disassociate from 
such associations and from the impact of the decisions of those in 
charge of such associations; or (3) the prospect for intervention by 
democratically elected governments of political entities when 
disassociation is an inadequate remedy. 
                                                 
 193 See note 64 supra. 
 194 E.g., James Manyika, et al, A new look at how corporations impact the economy and 
households, McKinsey Global Institute Discussion Paper (May 31, 2021), available at 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/a-new-
look-at-how-corporations-impact-the-economy-and-households. See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 58 (2005) 
(“Measured by the degree to which they affect our lives, corporate decisions designing and 
delivering cars, clothes, word processors, telephone service or electricity have at least as much 
impact as do most local governmental activities. In terms of coercion, it is easier to escape local 
governmental taxation than to avoid paying fees to corporations such as Microsoft, cable companies 
or major food processors; hospital bills are more likely to threaten our way of life than governmental 
traffic tickets.”) 
 195 E.g., Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Less Than One Percent of Businesses Employ 
Half of the Private Sector Workforce TAX FOUNDATION available at https://taxfoundation.org/less-
one-percent-businesses-employ-half-private-sector-workforce/ (November 26, 2014). 
 196 E.g., Tess Riley, Just 100 companies responsible for 71% of global emissions, study says, 
THE GUARDIAN https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-
companies-investors-responsible-71-global-emissions-cdp-study-climate-change (July 10, 2017) 
(addressing greenhouse gas emissions). 
 197 See, e.g., Jon D. Hansona1 & Douglas A. Kysara, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (presenting as a case study of 
market manipulation, the tobacco industry’s techniques to get consumers to disregard the risk of 
smoking). 
 198 E.g., Richard Posner, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘O8 AND THE DECENT INTO 




 In other words, the internal governance of corporations is simply 
one means for potentially giving democratic voice to those impacted 
by the decisions of corporate management. If internal governance 
gives such a democratic voice, then corporations serve as part of the 
democratic governance of society, rather than constituting a threat 
to it. To look to subnational political entities by analogy, this is why 
it is rare to hear assertions that the State of California, because of its 
wealth and power, constitutes a threat to democracy in the United 
States. After all, the government of the State of California is 
democratically elected. So long as the democratically elected 
officials do not take actions to undermine continued democratic 
accountability, the mere fact that the state is wealthy and powerful 
does not make it a threat to democracy.199 On the other hand, to the 
extent that the internal governance of corporations does not provide 
democratic voice to those impacted by the corporation, then one 
must look to the external means of democratic consent or 
accountability. 
 
 Those inclined toward a laissez faire ideology focus on the ability 
of individuals to either accept or avoid the impact of dealing with a 
corporation by the choice to either contract or refrain from 
contracting with it.200 Put in terms of democratic rather than 
economic values, individual choice through contracting or refusing 
to do so provides the consent of, and accountability to, the 
individuals potentially impacted by the decisions of those in charge 
of corporations. Thus, it achieves the underlying democratic goal of 
consent by or accountability to the governed. 
 
 The problem is that voluntary association and disassociation 
often might not provide consent and accountability. An obvious 
example is those harmed by corporate activities to which they did 
not agree, such as tort victims or the victims of environmental 
degradation caused by the corporation’s activities. In many other 
instances, market failures, such as limited realistic options in 
concentrated markets (for instance, those in which network effects 
create dominant positions for some companies),201 other situations 
involving unequal bargaining power,202 or inaccurate or insufficient 
                                                 
 199 Indeed, if the mere wealth and power of a political entity makes it a threat to democracy 
despite having a democratic government, then the United States itself is a threat to democracy. 
 200 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 22-25 (1996); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 156 at 777. 
 201 E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 120-121. 
 202 E.g., Yosifon, supra note 10 at 1200-01 (“Workers, having made firm-specific investments of 
their human capital and having made community-specific investments in other areas of their lives, 
may find it impossible to punish, or credibly threaten to punish, directors for such opportunistic 
conduct by exiting to other firms or labor markets.”). 
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information available to individuals dealing with corporations,203 
can render choice illusory. 
 
 In these situations, the availability of intervention by the 
democratically elected government of a political entity---whether 
this is through tort liability, safety and environmental regulations, 
antitrust enforcement, labor laws, or anti-fraud and mandatory 
disclosure laws---restores democratic accountability. Hence, even 
Milton Friedman’s famous essay,204 which argued that the job of 
corporate managers is solely to make money for the shareholders, 
added the qualifier “while conforming to the basic rules of the 
society [including] those embodied in law.”205 
 
 Needless to say, the appropriate line between government 
intervention and leaving protections to private contracting is a 
subject on which there long has been debate.206 From the standpoint 
of democratic values, however, the key is not whether Milton 
Friedman or Paul Krugman is right on where this line should fall. 
Rather, it is that democratically elected governments, acting in 
accordance with democratic principles, make the decision. 
 
 Here again, the internal meets the external in the relationship 
between corporations and democracy. The persons in charge of 
corporations not only make decisions affecting individuals impacted 
by corporate activities, but they also make decisions about 
deploying corporate resources to influence the government. This 
means that the non-democratic aspects of internal corporate 
governance not only cut off democratic consent or accountability 
through such internal governance for the corporation’s activities, but 
they also cut off such consent or accountability for the corporation’s 
efforts to influence government. Moreover, if such efforts are 
successful, then the prospect of government intervention also might 
fail to restore democratic consent and accountability. This brings us 
to Citizens United and corporate speech. 
 
B. The Debate about Corporate Speech 
 
 Much of the current concern about the anti-democratic influence 
of corporations focuses on corporate rights to free speech and the 
                                                 
 203 Id at 1201 (“Corporations can also manipulate the design of their products or engage in 
misleading advertising campaigns, distorting consumers’ risk perceptions or their evaluation of other 
product attributes.”); Hansona1 & Kysara, supra note 197 (discussing techniques companies 
successfully use to exploit consumer irrationality). 
 204 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profit, N.Y.T. SUN. 
MAG. 32 (Sept. 13, 1970). 
 205 Id at 33. 
 206 E.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1463 (1996). 
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Citizens United decision.207 In this decision, the Supreme Court 
struck down the federal ban on corporations making independent 
expenditures for “electioneering communication.” In a nutshell, the 
court held that Congress could not bar political speech simply 
because it came from a corporation.208 The result is to seemingly cut 
off the instinctive approach of many of those worried about 
excessive corporate influence on democratically elected 
governments, which is to bar corporations from at least some 
political activities open to individuals.  
 
 This, in turn, raises the question of whether the law can treat 
corporate political speech differently from speech by individuals. 
When all is said and done, there are essentially three arguments for 
doing so: one doctrinal, one results-oriented policy, and one 
consistent with democratic values. 
 
 1. The Corporate “Person” Distraction 
 
 A baseline doctrinal argument challenges whether corporations 
are “persons” subject to the same protections under the First 
Amendment as individuals.209 Specifically, corporations come into 
existence by act of government, not God, even if now carried out 
through easy compliance with general incorporation statutes. Hence, 
the argument runs, rather than being “endowed by their creator with 
certain unalienable rights,” corporations only possess those rights 
that the government finds it useful to give. This is known as the 
concession theory.210 Under a simple-minded version of this theory, 
the government can restrict free speech by corporations however 
much it wants.211 While there are counter-theories and back and 
forth,212 the problem with taking this argument to its logical extreme 
is that depriving corporations of the ability to assert free speech 
claims would severely endanger democracy. 
 
 After all, it was the New York Times Company which, in New 
York Times v. Sullivan,213 claimed protection under the First 
                                                 
 207 See note _ supra. 
 208 558 U.S. at 318-319. 
 209 E.g., Strine & Walter supra note 4 at 890-91.  
 210 E.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 
1635. 
 211 E.g., Greenwood, supra note 6 at 358-59. 
 212 E.g., Pollman, supra note 210 at 1660-63 (discussing alternative arguments for corporate 
Constitutional rights, including the aggregate theory, under which corporations are extended 
Constitutional rights to protect the interests of their shareholders, and the real entity theory, which 
asserts that corporations, like other human associations such as nations, take on a life of their own 
and therefore should be able to assert Constitutional rights). See also Nikolas Bowie, Book Review: 
Corporate Personhood versus Corporate Statehood, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2019) (arguing that 
the treatment of corporations as persons independent of their shareholders has actually led the 
Supreme Court to provide fewer Constitutional rights, while decisions extending Constitutional 
rights to corporations do so to protect the interests of individuals). 
 213 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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Amendment when the Montgomery Alabama Police Commissioner 
sued it for defamatory statements contained in an advertisement 
published in the Times by supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr. The 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment applied and a public 
official suing for defamation cannot recover unless he or she shows 
that the defendant knew the statement was false. The Court does not 
even discuss the fact that the New York Times Company is a 
corporation. Limiting the ability of government officials to stifle 
criticism by suing for defamation would seem to enhance 
democracy. Excluding corporations from asserting this First 
Amendment protection would leave out most publishers and news 
organizations.214 
 
 Another Supreme Court decision involving the New York Times 
Company, as well as the Washington Post Company (also a 
corporation), is New York Times Company v. United States.215 In this 
decision, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s request for 
an injunction blocking the two papers’ publication of the secret 
“Pentagon Papers”---a report prepared for the Department of 
Defense which documented the duplicitous history of public 
assurances by the United States’ government regarding the war in 
Vietnam. Once again, the defendants’ status as corporations merited 
no attention in extending free speech protection. Indeed, denying 
corporations the right to challenge a prior restraint on speech would 
allow the government to block disclosure it finds uncomfortable 
from the organs most likely to distribute such information to the 
public. 
 
 Of course, one might distinguish protections of speech from 
protections of “the press” or draw other distinctions based upon the 
nature of the corporation or the nature of the speech.216 This, 
however, renders broad discussion of the nature of corporate 
personhood and the First Amendment into something of a red 
herring. Once the law crosses the Rubicon of extending to some 
corporations, or corporations in some contexts, free speech rights, 
there needs to be a principled basis for saying when corporations 
                                                 
 214 In fact, an overwhelming bulk of the media are owned by only a half-dozen corporations. 
Nickie Louise, These 6 corporations control 90% of the media outlets in America, TECH STARTUPS, 
https://techstartups.com/2020/09/18/6-corporations-control-90-media-america-illusion-choice-
objectivity-2020/ (September 18, 2020). The major book publishers are generally corporations as 
well. See, e.g., Devin Clemens, The Ten Largest Publishing Companies in the World, THARAWAT 
MAG., https://www.tharawat-magazine.com/facts/ten-largest-publishing-companies/ (April 2, 2020). 
 215 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  
 216 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n. 57 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (distinguishing cases 
protecting speech by newspapers on this basis); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (“There can be little doubt that when a State creates a 
corporation with the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees 
that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law. Likewise, when 
a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that 
the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business.”). 
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will not enjoy such rights. Focusing on corporate “personhood” 
hardly seems to provide this lodestar. Nor is it necessary, since free 
speech cases draw all sorts of contextual distinctions in deciding 
when the government has infringed the free speech rights of 
individuals (who are clearly persons).217 
 
 2. The Corporate Wealth Argument 
 
 The common policy-oriented argument for limiting corporate 
political speech is that the excessive influence over politicians and 
government decisions that wealthy corporations can obtain through 
political expenditures and corporate speech creates a danger to 
democratic governance responsive to the interests of all Americans 
rather than the private greed of corporations.218 This argument 
commonly features eye-popping figures on the wealth of large 
corporations, as well as the amount of their expenditures on political 
speech, and discussions of the influence of such speech in advancing 
an agenda hostile to workers, consumers, the environment and so 
on.219 Sometimes, this is accompanied by a conspiratorial vision 
regarding the broader tenacles of those advancing an aggressively 
pro-business and anti-regulatory agenda through increasingly 
conservative courts and the like.220  
 
 Unfortunately, this line of argument often smacks of 
“corporations should not enjoy free speech when I do not like what 
they have to say.” Indeed, those who worry about corporate 
advocacy against regulations addressing worker pay and safety, the 
environment, or consumer protection, are not often heard expressing 
qualms about corporations flexing their wealth in order to promote 
racial equality or punish the intolerant among us.221 
                                                 
 217 E.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, “Incitement Lite” for the Nonpublic Forum, 85 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 149, 167 (2019) (discussing how “[t]he balance of government authority and individual speech 
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 219 E.g., Whitehouse & Stinnett, supra note 3 at ch. 3; Strine, supra note 2 at 431-2 n. 3, 439 n. 
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 220 Id at 450-474. Incidentally, rather than being some anti-corporate activist, Leo Strine, cited in 
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party-finds-a-new-but-shaky-faith-in (May 8, 2021) (charging hypocrisy by democrats supporting 
free speech rights of social media corporations to exclude content by Trump). Just to show that 




 In any event, the fundamental problem with the corporate wealth 
argument is that it fails to distinguish corporations from others who 
also derive political power from wealth (e.g., billionaires). Actually, 
the bulk of corporations are not that large.222 On the flip side, there 
is much writing on the political influence of the so-called donor class 
of billionaires and other wealthy individuals and families.223 While 
the very largest corporations have more wealth than the richest 
individuals,224 it is not clear how much this really matters. In other 
words, the wealthiest individuals have more than enough money to 
influence politics.225 Moreover, wealthy individuals are commonly 
such because they are shareholders in wealthy corporations.226 
Hence, limiting political expenditures by corporations, but not 
wealthy shareholders, might simply result in the same money 
coming from a different bank account. 
 
 Beyond this, the corporate wealth argument creates serious 
difficulty when it comes to media corporations. As discussed above 
when dealing the two New York Times decisions, speech by news 
media corporations may be critical to maintaining a democracy. Yet, 
“the press” might also include such dominant corporations as 
Facebook and Google.227 In addition, even the most conventional 
news outlets are often part of larger corporate groups whose political 
agendas could reach far beyond broadcasting the news.228 Finally, 
recent years have shown that corporate influence can be as powerful 
and potentially threatening to democracy when it simply consists of 
broadcasting supposedly “fair and balanced” news as it can be when 
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 227 See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011) 
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advertisement placed in the Times and that Facebook and Google’s primary revenues come from 
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consisting of overt political expenditures by a corporation that 
makes no claim to be part of the press.229 
 
 Ultimately, defending Citizen United’s rejection of the corporate 
wealth argument is not to discount the concern about money in 
politics. Indeed, perhaps where the Court has gone wrong lies in an 
all-to-casual equation of spending money with any other form of 
speech in which more is better.230 Ignored is the concern that 
allowing those with greater wealth to have greater political influence 
seems contrary to the democratic value of equality among voters. 
Nevertheless, this concern is not limited to corporate speech. 
 
 3. Who Decides What a Corporation Says? 
 
 The one thing regarding speech that is undeniably different 
between a corporation and an individual is that a corporation cannot 
actually decide what it is going to say; instead, those in charge of 
the company make that decision. This returns us to the interplay of 
the internal and the external with respect to the relationship between 
corporations and democracy. Specifically, the undemocratic nature 
of corporate governance means a lack of democratic consent or 
accountability not only for decisions regarding corporate conduct, 
but also for decisions about employing corporate resources to lobby 
against government intervention that would restore democratic 
accountability.231 
 
  a. Speech Advancing Idiosyncratic Views of those in 
   Charge 
 
 The ability of those in charge of a corporation to dictate the 
company’s political speech creates potential issues in two basic 
contexts: one being rather trivial, the other presenting a fundamental 
issue regarding democracy. The former involves corporate speech 
in favor of what, for want of better terminology, we can label the 
idiosyncratic views of those in charge of the corporation. 
Idiosyncratic in this context does not mean that the views are not 
widely held. Rather, this term is intended to capture the essential 
notion that the views are not particularly relevant to the corporate 
enterprise.232 
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 This is the type of speech addressed in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti.233 In this decision, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited banks and business 
corporations from spending money to influence referenda other than 
those that affected the property or business of the corporation. This 
statute seemed to be an obvious effort to force management of a 
business corporation to stick to business when it came to political 
expenditures. 
 
 In fact, the issues raised in this context are rather minor in the 
greater scheme of corporations and democracy. For one thing, it is 
not necessary to address the failings in corporate or shareholder 
democracy in order to address these issues. Even if one assumes that 
corporate or shareholder democracy perfectly matches democratic 
values and practices, there are still likely to be minority shareholders 
who might object to a particular idiosyncratic political position 
being advanced at corporate expense. The question is whether states 
have the power to protect such minority shareholders from having 
their corporation’s assets used to subsidize such views. 
 
 Since one of the traditional functions of state corporate law has 
been to protect minority shareholders from having the corporation’s 
assets used by those in charge, even when supported by the majority 
of shareholders, for purposes beyond that for which the minority 
shareholders signed up (conducting lawful business),234 an 
affirmative answer to this question should be easy.235 The Court 
nevertheless held that the particular statute before the Court in 
                                                 
contributions to Princeton University. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). 
Realistically, however, there are situations in which the corporation’s position reflects the 
happenstance that the individuals in charge wish to advance a particular view, but there is nothing 
inherent in the nature of the corporation’s business or in the interests of whoever would run the 
corporation’s business that commonly would have produced the same corporate speech if someone 
else was in charge. 
 233 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 234 This is the ultra vires doctrine. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8 at 226-232. 
 235 The common response to this concern is that no one forces an individual to purchase stock in 
a particular company. Hence, if individuals do not like the views of those in charge, they do not need 
to be shareholders. E.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686-87 (1990) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting). Yet, this view allows those who gain power over a corporation to force 
investors to conflate business (whether the corporation is a profitable investment) with political 
decisions. This implicates the statutory purpose of a business corporation. State corporation statutes 
(taking corporation in its broadest sense as not limited to business corporations) generally provide a 
menu of choices as to the purpose of the corporation that organizers can establish. This includes 
corporations formed for various non-profit purposes---religious, charitable, educational, and the like. 
Under these circumstances, what is wrong with the state insisting that those who chose to form a 
business rather than another type of corporation, and sought investors’ money based upon this 
characterization, not force prospective shareholders into making their investment decisions based on 
factors other than business? This is not to say that states should curb this sort of corporate speech. 
Rather, it simply suggests there is nothing untoward in states doing so. 
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Bellotti infringed on the First Amendment because it was over- and 
under-inclusive relative to this goal.236 
 
 In any event, the practical impact of corporate speech which falls 
into this context is relatively small. Because the positions taken by 
the corporation in this context, by definition, flow from the views of 
whoever happens to be in charge, these positions will exhibit a 
certain randomness.237 This, in turn, suggests less grounds for worry 
about undue corporate influence over government. So, for example, 
positions urged by corporations with more socially progressive 
management will offset positions urged by corporations with more 
socially conservative management and so the impact is simply more 
speech rather than pushing governmental action in a single direction. 
While one might object to the ability of some individuals to gain 
greater influence by using the money of other people who might not 
subscribe to their views, this does not appear to present a significant 
structural threat to governance of the overall society in accordance 
with democratic values.238 
 
  b. Speech Advancing the Interests of those  
   Structurally in Charge of Corporations over the 
   Interests of those not 
 
 The context in which corporate speech potentially implicates the 
overall democratic governance of society is where the speech favors 
the interests of those groups structurally in charge of corporations 
(management and majority shareholders) at the expense of those 
with less or no voice through corporate or shareholder democracy 
but who nevertheless are impacted by the corporation and contribute 
                                                 
 236 Indeed, this decision might be more about how the law is supposed to protect dissenting 
minority shareholders from management using corporate resources to fund personally, rather than 
business, motivated political speech, than it is about whether the law can do so. See, e.g., Victor 
Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE 
L.J. 235 (1981). Specifically, the Court suggests that minority shareholders might seek such 
protection by filing a derivative suit. This, however, leaves things to the case-by-case judicial 
determinations that corporation statutes sought to reduce through provisions such as those allowing 
corporations to make charitable contributions. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8 at 229. The result of 
Bellotti is to block the legislature from creating this sort of bright line clarity (which is always going 
to be over- or under-inclusive) on the negative side for political expenditures.  
 237 See, e.g., David Gelles, Delta and Coca-Cola Reverse Course on Georgia Voting Law, 
Stating ‘Crystal Clear’ Opposition, NY TIMES https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/delta-
coca-cola-georgia-voting-law.html (March 31, 2021) (discussing Delta Airlines’ and Coca-Cola’s 
changing position regarding Georgia’s law making voting more difficult); Matthew Futterman, NFL 
Owners Clashed in Private Over Protests, WALL ST. J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nfl-owners-
clashed-over-protests-1506974582 (October 2, 2017) (discussing disagreements between owners of 
NFL football teams regarding player protests during the national anthem). 
 238 One other context involving corporate political speech illustrated by recent events occurs 
where the speech is not aimed at influencing listeners to support a particular position, but rather at 
maintaining corporate goodwill by coming out in support of positions popular with prospective 
customers or employees. Since the point of such advertising is simply to say that the corporation 
agrees with what it thinks the listener already believes, rather than to sway the listener’s political 
views, the impact of such expenditures on democratic governance is even more trivial than corporate 
speech in favor of the idiosyncratic views of its management.  
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toward its wealth. In other words, the problem flows from 
interaction of the internal (the failure of corporate or shareholder 
democracy to reflect democratic values) with the external (corporate 
speech seeking to block democratic governments of political entities 
from protecting the interests of those lacking voice through 
corporate or shareholder democracy). 
 
 In fact, there are several overlapping threads to this concern, hints 
of which are buried in the muddled distortion argument in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.239 In Austin, the Court upheld a 
Michigan prohibition of corporations making independent 
expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates for office---a 
result the Court overruled in Citizens United. In upholding this 
statute, the Court in Austin pointed to the “distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help 
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 240 
 
 At first glance, this seems to be just a gussied-up form of the 
corporate wealth argument. Specifically, corporations, or indeed 
anyone with greater wealth,241 might use their wealth to obtain 
influence that has no correlation to the public support for the ideas 
being advanced---in contrast with small dollar donations to political 
causes in which the amount of money available is roughly 
proportionate to the number of individuals who support the cause. 
Yet, this understates the matter. 
 
 It is not simply that the wealth available does not correlate with 
public support of the cause advanced by those in charge of the 
corporation in this context. Rather, the problem is that the amount 
of corporate money available to seek political influence in this 
context is likely to be inversely proportionate to the support of the 
corporation’s cause from those who are contributing to the 
corporation’s wealth but lack a say in its governance. 
 
 Keep in mind that this context involves lobbying for policies that 
favor those in charge of the corporation over others---such as 
employees, consumers, involuntary victims of the corporation’s 
activities---who also contributed to the corporation’s wealth. Hence, 
the larger number of individuals from whom those in charge of the 
corporation can extract corporate wealth, the more wealth they have 
                                                 
 239 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 240 Id at 660. 
 241 Justice Marshall’s majority opinion tries to distinguish the use of corporate wealth by arguing 
that the law (corporate personhood, transferable interests, and limited liability) facilitates such 
wealth. Yet, laws allowing inheritance and, even more fundamentally, that protect property rights, 
are necessary for the existence of inherited wealth. 
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available to lobby against government efforts to intervene on behalf 
of such individuals. Moreover, the more successful such lobbying is 
in preventing government intervention to protect those lacking 
either voice through internal corporate governance or effective 
avenues to avoid dealing with the corporation, the more wealth those 
in charge of the corporation have available to lobby. 
 
 Worse yet, corporate lobbying, if it results in government 
facilitated monopoly---as, for example, through patent protection of 
critical pharmaceuticals---not only blocks the government from 
intervening on behalf of those lacking voice through internal 
corporate governance but also limits democratic accountability 
through disassociation. Indeed, the more monopoly power 
corporations possess, the more wealth corporations may obtain to 
influence government and the more corporations influence 
government, the more monopoly power they may obtain to increase 
their wealth and dictate the lives of those who lack a voice in their 
governance.242 
 
 All told, to indulge in a bit of hyperbole, it is as if a thieves’ guild 
used their ill-gotten loot to lobby government to reduce the funding 
of police or to pass laws banning the manufacture and sale of locks. 
 
C. The Choice 
 
 This brings us back again to the yin and yang of corporations and 
democracy. In this instance, the dualism arises in a pair of tools to 
address the potentially undemocratic impact of corporations on the 
governance of society. Following the theme of this article, one tool 
deals with the corporation’s relations with external government 
while the other deals with internal corporate governance. Further 
dualism arises in the potential for unintended consequences in both 
of these approaches, which is reminiscent of the paradoxes 
regarding corporations and democracy found in the history of 
corporate law. 
 
 1. Curbing Corporate Political Influence 
 
 Much writing243 and even more political posturing244 on the topic 
of corporations and democracy advocate actions external to the 
                                                 
 242 E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 119-120 (referring to this as the “Medici vicious circle”). 
 243 See note 3 supra. 
 244 E.g., Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders, Saving American Democracy Amendment (Dec. 
8, 2011), 
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/recent-business/saving-american-democracy-amendment 
[https://perma.cc/H59S-4BP6]; S.J. Res. 33, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011) (Constitutional amendment 
proposed by Senator Sanders to overturn Citizens United by declaring that Constitutional rights do 
not belong to for-profit corporations). 
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corporation to curb corporate political influence. Given the attitude 
of a majority of the Supreme Court toward curbs on corporate 
political activities and the difficulties of amending the Constitution, 
this discussion can take on a sort of science fiction quality.245 
Nevertheless, it is the purview of a law review article to talk about 
what should be and not just what is. 
 
 Consistent with the theme of this article, the lodestar of our 
discussion is pursuing democracy and democratic values. Hence, the 
object is not to curb corporate political influence in order to advance 
an agenda aiding employees, consumers, the environment or so on 
because this is a better social outcome. Rather, it is to ensure 
democratic consent and accountability when neither internal 
corporate governance nor the individual ability to deal or not with 
the corporation provides such. This means we must evaluate the 
impact of corporate political influence not simply by whether it 
succeeds or fails,246 but rather by whether it interferes with decision 
making consistent with democratic values. 
 
 It turns out that the corporate part of corporate political influence 
might be largely irrelevant when it comes addressing this inquiry. 
To see why, consider the various ways in which corporate political 
activity could be contrary to democratic norms. 
 
 The one on which there is the most agreement is corruption247---
in other words, seeking influence through payments or actions 
beneficial to government officials. With a sufficient quid pro quo 
this can meet the definition of bribery;248 but it can be problematic 
even if falling short of that.249 Getting into a discussion of 
                                                 
 245 But see Levitt, supra note 6 (discussing openings left by Citizens United). 
 246 Of course, if corporate wealth rarely translates into political influence sufficient to change 
government policy, then there is no reason to discuss whether corporate political influence is a threat 
to democracy. In fact, there is some debate about the degree to which corporate or any other wealth 
translates into political influence. While this is often asserted by those worried about the political 
influence of corporations (e.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 122-25 (giving examples), or worried about 
money in politics more generally, critics can point to counterexamples of expensive campaigns or 
other efforts to influence government that failed in their objectives. E.g., Meg Fowler, The Most 
Expensive, Failed Primary Campaigns, ABC NEWS, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/expensive-
failed-primary-campaigns-past-decade/story?id=15483044 (January 31, 2012). There are also 
organized groups lobbying against corporate positions, such as unions and consumer groups. E.g., 
Yosifon, supra note 10 at 1203-04. 
          Ultimately, whether corporate or other wealth can yield political influence is an empirical 
question, which this article will assume to be the case at least to some degree. Without delving into 
the empirical evidence, there are a couple of grounds to support this assumption. The obvious is that 
those whose money and elections are at stake must think it works. The other is that the Supreme 
Court’s protection of such expenditures under the First Amendment would be rather pointless if the 
Court did not assume such expenditures mattered. 
 247 E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27 (interest in preventing corruption justified limiting campaign 
contributions). 
 248 Id at 27. 
 249 E.g., Khadija Lalani, McDonnell v. United States: Legalized Corruption and the Need For 
Statutory Reform, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 29 (2018). 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr_online/265 (discussing whether actions not 
technically within the definition of bribery should nevertheless be banned as corrupt). 
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corruption, campaign finance and the like is well beyond the scope 
of this article. Fortunately, it is also unnecessary. This is because it 
is difficult to understand why the individual versus corporate source 
of a potentially corrupt action should make any difference.250 
 
 The use of greater wealth to gain greater political influence raises 
an issue beyond simply the prospect for corruption. In a society with 
unequally distributed wealth, the ability of those with greater wealth 
to have greater influence arguably offends the democratic value of 
equality among voters and, many argue, endangers continued 
democratic government.251 The acceptance of these arguments is 
much more contentious.252 Fortunately, again, it is unnecessary to 
get into this debate. While large corporations are wealthy, they are 
not unique in that regard.253   
 
 This article discussed above a problem that does, at first glance, 
seem to arise from corporations. Specifically, those in charge of a 
corporation can use the wealth generated by its business to lobby 
government against the interests of those who are also contributing 
to this wealth but who are not in charge. In this manner, those in 
charge might be able to use their control over wealth to which others 
have voluntarily or involuntarily contributed in order to escape any 
democratic accountability to those impacted by their decisions and 
who helped create this wealth. 
 
 This, however, is not a problem limited to corporate expenditures. 
For one thing, it arises with all businesses regardless of whether they 
operate in corporate or non-corporate form. Moreover, to the extent 
that those controlling corporations (managers, majority 
shareholders, or shareholders more generally) personally obtain 
money from the corporation through dividends, stock buybacks, 
compensation packages or otherwise, they still could use income to 
which others have contributed in order to lobby government for 
                                                 
 250 To illustrate, consider the corrupting influence of employment of former government officials 
by those they regulated while in government (the “revolving door” problem). It should hardly matter 
if such employment is by a corporation or by a law firm organized as an LLP, which firm represents 
those regulated by the agency at which the former official worked. 
 251 E.g., United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Social Report 2020: 
Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-
content/uploads/sites/22/2020/02/World-Social-Report2020-FullReport.pdf 48-51; Sanford Lakoff, 
Inequality as a Danger to Democracy: Reflections on Piketty's Warning, 130 POL. SCI. Q. 425 
(2015). There are a couple of arguments as to why greater influence by those with greater wealth, 
irrespective of corruption, not only is inconsistent with the democratic value of equality among 
voters but also presents a long-term danger to continued democracy. The first raises the prospect of a 
spiral in which greater political influence by the wealthy leads to greater income inequality, which, 
in turn, leads to even greater political influence by the wealthy. Ultimately, this can result in a de 
facto oligarchy. In addition, widespread recognition of the overwhelming influence that the wealthy 
enjoy over government can weaken support for democracy among the broader electorate and fuel the 
rise of autocrats.  
 252 E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 649 (rejecting equality argument) 
 253 See note 223 and accompanying text supra. 
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actions favoring their interests over the interests of others impacted 
by their decisions and who helped create this wealth.254 
 
 All of this is to suggest that Citizens United’s rejection of 
categorical treatment of corporations when it comes to political 
speech is not the problem. Indeed, in many ways it might be the 
solution. If one could limit (despite Buckley) the use of wealth in 
political speech, placing corporations within the same limit as any 
individual would remove the advantage of corporations which hold 
more wealth than individuals. At the same time, placing individuals 
under the cap imposed on corporations more completely addresses 
the problem of using wealth to lobby against the interests of those 
who also contributed to its creation but have no voice in its use. 
 
 In fact, one might argue that the problem of using corporate (or, 
more broadly, business) income to lobby against the interests of 
those who contributed to its creation but have no voice in its use can 
justify some cap on the use of money in political speech even if one 
does not accept the voter equality rationale. Unfortunately, there is 
a degree of circularity in this argument. This is because the thieves’ 
guild metaphor used earlier begs the question. 
 
 This metaphor assumes that various parties contributing to the 
wealth under the control the stockholder majority and corporate 
management, like the thieves’ victims, not only lack a democratic 
voice through internal corporate governance, but also lack 
democratic consent and accountability through their ability to deal 
or not deal with the corporation. Hence, a predicate question from a 
democratic values standpoint is whether some externality, market 
failure or the like exists---a topic on which there is often a difference 
of opinion in specific situations.255 Moreover, even if there is some 
externality or market failure removing democratic consent or 
accountability through individual choice, this does not mean that 
decisions by those in charge of corporations were necessarily 
contrary to the interests of other corporate stakeholders or that 
government action would be better for them. Again, these are 
questions on which there is often a difference of opinion in specific 
situations.256 
 
 Hence, limiting the ability of those in charge of corporations to 
use corporate wealth to lobby against regulation or the like, on the 
ground that this is a misuse of wealth against the interests of 
                                                 
 254 Admittedly, this might involve tax disadvantages relative to the corporation using its money. 
 255 E.g., Ryan Bourne, How ‘Market Failure’ Arguments Lead to Misguided Policy, 
https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/how-market-failure-arguments-lead-misguided-policy (January 
22, 2019). 
 256 Id. 
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nonconsenting parties who contributed to its creation, to some extent 
curbs the ability of those in charge of corporations to make the case 
that this is not true in the situation at hand. The result could be that 
instead of promoting democratic decision making, we might be 
interfering with it. On the other hand, there is a difference between 
allowing expenditures to make one’s case and rewarding those able 
to prevail in an unlimited spending arm’s race by using money 
extracted from the opposition in the race. In other words, there is a 
difference between barring for-profit corporations from some types 
of political speech (as in Citizens United) and imposing reasonable 
caps on how much one can spend. 
 
 2. Democratizing Corporate Democracy 
 
 The alternate approach looks to the internal governance of 
corporations. It takes advantage of the separation of ownership and 
control embedded in the corporate governance model of an elected 
board in order to institute reforms that might be more difficult in 
businesses, such as partnerships, in which the owners personally 
govern.257 The goal is to have corporate governance follow 
democratic values. This would render government intervention to 
protect those lacking voice through internal corporate governance 
unnecessary to assuring democratic accountability. 
 
 To pursue this alternative, we need to address the anti-democratic 
features in current corporate election mechanics, such as the lack of 
access to the corporation’s proxy solicitation by nominees other than 
those picked by the incumbent directors. More fundamentally (and 
challenging) is to end the pay-to-play essence of corporate or 
shareholder democracy. This requires extending the right to vote for 
corporate directors to non-shareholders who are impacted by the 
decisions of directors. 
 
 In fact, a number of countries do this to some extent. Their laws 
grant employees the right to elect a certain number of the directors. 
This is commonly referred to as co-determination because both 
shareholders and employees determine the composition of the board 
and thus have a voice in the overall governance of the corporation. 
Germany pioneered co-determination laws, which are also found in 
                                                 
 257 See, e.g., Rev’d. Unif. P’ship. Act § 401(h) (partners have equal rights to participate in 
management unless otherwise provided in partnership agreement). This raises the question of 
whether corporate governance reform will lead to regulatory arbitrage through choice of non-
corporate forms of business. See, e.g., Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2 at 63 (listing 




a number of other European countries258 and China.259 Such laws 
typically allow employees to elect a minority of the corporation’s 
directors (such as one-third); albeit employees elect one-half of the 
directors in the largest German companies.260 Perhaps prompted by 
proposals made by Senator Elizabeth Warren and others during the 
2020 election campaign,261 some scholars have recently advocated 
adoption of co-determination for corporations in the United 
States.262 
 
 While co-determination would move corporate governance 
toward more democratic norms, it does not fully address the pay-to-
play system. Co-determination, at least as adopted by other countries 
so far, never gives employees as much power on the board as the 
shareholders.263 More broadly, this leaves out a voice in corporate 
governance for others impacted by the decisions of those in charge 
of corporations. This includes consumers, lenders, and the overall 
community in which the corporation operates. 
 
 In their article arguing for co-determination,264 Grant Hayden and 
Matthew Bodie attempt to distinguish employees and shareholders 
from these other interested groups based upon the criteria of how 
much stake the group has in the corporation and the administrative 
practicality of determining eligibility to vote. On the other hand, the 
existence of various consumer governed cooperatives---such as 
mutual insurance companies,265 credit unions,266 consumer coop 
stores267---illustrates that it is mechanically possible in some 
situations for consumers to have a voice. 
 
 From time to time, corporate law scholars have floated proposals 
for corporate boards composed of directors representing multiple 
                                                 
 258 E.g., id at 67-70 (listing co-determination laws in Europe). 
 259 E.g., Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in 
China, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 347, 353 (2005). 
 260 See note 258 supra. 
 261 E.g., ACCOUNTABLE CAPITALISM ACT, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 262 Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9. 
 263 Even for the largest German corporations in which workers elect half the board, the 
shareholder-elected directors pick the board’s chair, who gets a tie-breaking vote. E.g., Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 474 (2007). 
 264 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9. 
 265 E.g., Patricia Born et al., Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks 
versus Mutuals, in David F. Bradford, ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 167, 167-
68 (1998) (explaining that mutual insurance companies, in which the customers (policy holders) own 
the corporation and elect the board of directors, accounted for 25 percent of overall property-
casualty premiums in the United States in 1991). 
 266 E.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible Investing: A 
Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 604 (2011) (“In theory, the most democratically 
governed financial institutions are credit unions. Organized as cooperatives, they are owned by their 
members who share equally in their governance”). 
 267 E.g., REI Board of Directors https://www.rei.com/about-rei/board-of-directors (“REI is the 
nation's largest consumer co-operative. A . . . board of directors selected from REI's membership 
oversees the company.”). 
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constituencies.268 At this point, complexity increases exponentially. 
For example, who would vote for the directors representing those 
potentially injured by corporate pollution?269 
 
 In any event, this still leaves the problem of voting in proportion 
to stock, rather than one-person, one-vote. Perhaps the law could 
mandate a one-person, one-vote system when it comes to voting by 
shareholders. Not only is this the rule barring agreement to the 
contrary for partnerships,270 but it was also the system for many 
early corporations.271  
 
 Actually, shareholder voting by the amount of stock owned 
versus one-person, one-vote will not matter as much in a corporation 
whose board is elected by multiple constituencies rather than just by 
the shareholders. This is because the primary practical impact of 
voting by shares rather than one-person, one-vote occurs in the 
corporation with a majority or otherwise controlling shareholder. 
Under the current corporate governance system, control by a 
majority shareholder looks more like autocratic or dictatorial rule 
than what comes to mind when speaking of shareholder democracy. 
In a system in which shareholders no longer control the majority of 
the board, such autocracy is no longer a given.272 
 
 One could avoid many of the complexities of multi-stakeholder 
elected boards by having the government appoint those in charge of 
businesses over a certain size---in other words, nationalization or 
socialism. The common objection is that government control of 
corporations often leads to politically motivated or outright corrupt 
decisions, lack of innovation, and economic inefficiency.273 
 
 Staying with the focus of this article on corporations and 
democracy, the overlap of nationalization or socialism with non-
                                                 
 268 E.g., Yosifan, supra note 10 at 1237; Kent Greenfield, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 149 (2006). 
 269 One proof of the difficulty of figuring this all out is that such proposals simply float a few 
ideas rather than explaining how this would all work. 
 270 Rev’d. Unif. P’ship. Act § 401(h). 
 271 E.g., Dunlavy, supra note 84 (discussing voting arrangements in the early corporations in the 
United States); Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 149, 156-57 (1888) (describing the evolution in voting in the East India Company 
from the original one-member, one-vote to voting in proportion to shares in the joint stock). 
 272 Conversely, a one-person, one-vote system might allow other corporate stakeholders to gain 
power in corporate elections without expanding the franchise beyond those who own stock. This is 
because it opens the prospect for employees or other stakeholders to gain significant votes without 
unrealistic expenditures to buy stock. Ratner, supra note _ at 34. Incidentally, illustrating the 
potential for unintended consequences, one-person, one-vote eliminates the ability of corporations to 
operate through subsidiaries other than those that are wholly-owned---which may or may not be a 
bad thing. 




democratic or outright totalitarian regimes274 raises an obvious 
concern. Of course, correlation is not causation and so government 
control over corporations in many notorious dictatorial regimes does 
not prove that such socialism promotes dictatorial regimes as 
opposed to the other way around. This is more so since government 
control of many large firms is also found in democratic countries.275 
In any event, it would unduly extend the length of this article to 
address the arguments by those such as Hayek that government 
control over major industries inevitably leads to undemocratic 
governments.276 
 
 All told, any effort to democratize corporate governance by 
attacking the pay-to-play system raises complex questions and the 
potential for unintended consequences. Accordingly, it is useful to 
keep in mind that human institutions are imperfect, and democracy 
is commonly a matter of more versus less. Hence, much as the 
history of democracy in general is a history of expanding voting 
rights to different groups, expanded voting rights in corporations 
might start with co-determination and gradually work to include 
other stakeholders. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The relationship between corporations and democracy involves 
both the internal governance of corporations and the external impact 
of corporations on the overall governance of society. This stems 
from the reality that those in charge of corporations make decisions 
that significantly impact individuals in society. If the governance of 
society is to be truly democratic, then those making decisions for 
corporations must have some consent by or accountability to the 
individuals impacted by their decisions. 
 
 Despite some democratic features, corporate or shareholder 
democracy as currently conceived is inconsistent with fundamental 
democratic values and thus fails at this task---a function perhaps of 
economic utilitarianism prevailing over democratic ideals. The 
ability of individuals to deal or refuse to deal with a particular 
corporation provides such consent and accountability in many, if not 
the bulk, of instances. Nevertheless, externalities and market 
failures leave significant gaps. In this event, the availability of 
intervention by a democratically elected government of a political 
                                                 
 274 E.g., Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2917, 2918-2919 (2012) (“government-controlled firms account for about 80 percent of the 
market capitalization in China, 60 percent in Russia”). These figures, of course, post-date the more 
extreme government ownership in the Soviet Union or Maoist China. 
 275 E.g., id at 2948 (“By 1977, nineteen (38 percent) of the top fifty largest industrial companies 
in Europe were state-owned”).  
 276 E.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
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entity is necessary to restore accountability. Here is the real 
democratic deficit potentially created by Citizens United: If those 
controlling corporations, who are not democratically accountable 
through internal corporate governance, can make unlimited use of 
corporate resources to influence government against such 
intervention, they could also lack accountability through the actions 
of democratically elected governments of political entities. 
 
 For corporations to be part of, rather than antithetical to, the 
democratic governance of society, we face a choice: Either there 
should be some cap on the use resources generated by the 
corporation to lobby against government intervention protecting the 
interests of those lacking representation through corporate 
democracy, or else we should reform corporate democracy to be 
consistent with democratic values---or perhaps a bit of both. 
